War communism activities and results. The policy of "war communism", its essence

#politics # 1918 # 1921

1. The main problems of "war communism" in historiography

In the view of the classics of orthodox Marxism, socialism as a social system presupposes the complete destruction of all commodity-money relations, since it is these relations that are the breeding ground for the revival of capitalism. However, these relations may disappear not earlier than the complete disappearance of the institution of private ownership of all means of production and tools of labor, but for the implementation of this most important task, a whole historical epoch is needed.

This fundamental position of Marxism found its visible embodiment in the economic policy of the Bolsheviks, which they began to pursue in December 1917, almost immediately after the seizure of state power in the country. But, having quickly failed on the economic front, in March - April 1918 the leadership of the Bolshevik Party tried to return to Lenin's "April Theses" and establish state capitalism in a country ravaged by war and revolution. The large-scale Civil War and foreign intervention put an end to these utopian illusions of the Bolsheviks, forcing the top leadership of the party to return to the previous economic policy, which then received the very capacious and accurate name of the policy of "war communism".

For quite a long time, many Soviet historians were convinced that the very concept of war communism was first developed by V.I. Lenin in 1918. However, this statement does not fully correspond to the truth, since he first used the very concept of "war communism" only in April 1921 in his famous article "On the food tax". Moreover, as established by the "late" Soviet historians (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov, V. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov), this term was first introduced into scientific circulation by the famous Marxist theoretician Alexander Bogdanov (Malinovsky) back in 1917.

In January 1918, returning to the study of this problem in his well-known work "Questions of Socialism", A.A. Bogdanov, having studied the historical experience of a number of bourgeois states during the First World War, equated the concepts of "war communism" and "state military capitalism." In his opinion, a whole historical gap lay between socialism and war communism, since “war communism” was a consequence of the regression of the productive forces and epistemologically was a product of capitalism and a complete rejection of socialism, and not its initial phase, as the Bolsheviks themselves, first of all, believed left communists "during the Civil War.

The same opinion is now shared by many other scientists, in particular, Professor S.G. Kara-Murza, who argued that "war communism" as a special economic structure has nothing to do with either communist doctrine, let alone Marxism. The very concept of "war communism" simply means that in a period of total devastation, society (society) is forced to transform into a community or commune, and nothing more. In modern historical science, there are still several key problems associated with the study of the history of war communism.

I. Since when should the policy of war communism be counted.

A number of Russian and foreign historians (N. Sukhanov) believe that the policy of war communism was proclaimed almost immediately after the victory of the February Revolution, when the bourgeois Provisional Government, at the suggestion of the first minister of agriculture, cadet A.I. Shingareva, having issued the law "On the transfer of grain to the state" (March 25, 1917), introduced a state monopoly on bread throughout the country and established fixed prices for grain.

Other historians (R. Danels, V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov) link the approval of "war communism" with the famous decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR "On the nationalization of large-scale industry and railway transport enterprises", which was issued on June 28, 1918. According to V. .AT. Kabanov and V.P. Buldakov, the policy of war communism itself went through three main phases in its development: "nationalization" (June 1918), "kombedov" (July - December 1918) and "militaristic" (January 1920 - February 1921) ...

Third historians (E. Gimpelson) believe that the beginning of the policy of war communism should be considered May - June 1918, when the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopted two most important decrees that initiated the food dictatorship in the country: "On the emergency powers of the People's Commissar for Food" ( May 13, 1918) and "On the committees of the rural poor" (June 11, 1918).

The fourth group of historians (G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov) is convinced that after a "year-long period of trial and error", the Bolsheviks, having issued the decree "On the food appropriation of grain and fodder" (January 11, 1919), made their final the choice in favor of the surplus appropriation system, which became the backbone of the entire policy of war communism in the country.

Finally, the fifth group of historians (S. Pavlyuchenkov), prefer not to name a specific date for the beginning of the policy of war communism and, referring to the well-known dialectical position of F. Engels, says that "absolutely sharp dividing lines are not compatible with the theory of development as such." Although S.A. Pavlyuchenkov is inclined to start counting the policy of war communism with the beginning of the "Red Guard attack on capital", that is, from December 1917.

II. The reasons for the policy of "war communism".

In Soviet and partly Russian historiography (I. Berkhin, E. Gimpelson, G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov, I. Ratkovsky), the policy of War Communism has traditionally been reduced to a series of exclusively forced, purely economic measures caused by foreign intervention and the Civil War. Most Soviet historians have emphasized in every way the smooth and gradual nature of the introduction of this economic policy into practice.

In European historiography (L. Samueli) it has traditionally been asserted that “war communism” was not so much conditioned by the hardships and hardships of the Civil War and foreign intervention, as it had a powerful ideological base, dating back to the ideas and works of K. Marx, F. Engels and K. Kautsky.

According to a number of modern historians (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov), subjectively "war communism" was caused by the desire of the Bolsheviks to hold out until the beginning of the world proletarian revolution, and objectively, this policy was supposed to solve the most important modernization task - to close the gigantic gap between the economic structures of an industrial city and a patriarchal village. Moreover, the policy of war communism was a direct continuation of the "Red Guard attack on capital", since both of these political courses were related by the frantic pace of the main economic measures: the complete nationalization of banks, industrial and commercial enterprises, the ousting of state cooperation and the organization of a new system of state distribution through productive and consumer communes, an obvious tendency towards naturalization of all economic relations within the country, etc.

Many authors are convinced that all the leaders and prominent theoreticians of the Bolshevik Party, including V.I. Lenin, L.D. Trotsky and N.I. Bukharin, viewed the policy of War Communism as a pillar road leading directly to socialism. This concept of "Bolshevik utopianism" was especially clearly presented in the well-known theoretical works of the "left communists" who imposed on the party the model of "war communism" that it implemented in 1919-1920. In this case, we are talking about two well-known works of N.I. Bukharin's "The Program of the Communists-Bolsheviks" (1918) and "The Economy of the Transition Period" (1920), as well as about the popular opus by N.I. Bukharin and E.A. Preobrazhensky's "The ABC of Communism" (1920), which are now rightly called "literary monuments of the collective folly of the Bolsheviks."

According to a number of modern scientists (Yu. Emelyanov), it was N.I. Bukharin in his famous work "The Economy of the Transition Period" (1920) deduced from the practice of "war communism" a whole theory of revolutionary transformations based on the universal law of the complete collapse of the bourgeois economy, production anarchy and concentrated violence, which would completely change the economic system of bourgeois society and build socialism is on its ruins. Moreover, in the firm conviction of this "Favorite of the whole party" and "The largest party theorist", as V.I. Lenin, "Proletarian coercion in all its forms, from executions to labor service, is, strange as it may seem, a method of developing communist humanity from the human material of the capitalist era."

Finally, according to other modern scholars (S. Kara-Murza), "war communism" became an inevitable consequence of the catastrophic situation in the country's national economy, and in this situation it played an extremely important role in saving the lives of millions of people from inevitable starvation. Moreover, all attempts to prove that the policy of War Communism had doctrinal roots in Marxism are absolutely groundless, since only a handful of Bolshevik maximalists in the person of N.I. Bukharin and Co.

III. The problem of the results and consequences of the policy of "war communism".

Almost all Soviet historians (I. Mints, V. Drobizhev, I. Brekhin, E. Gimpelson) not only idealized "war communism" in every possible way, but in fact avoided any objective assessments of the main results and consequences of this destructive economic policy of the Bolsheviks during the Civil War. ... According to the majority of modern authors (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov), this idealization of "war communism" was largely due to the fact that this political course had a huge impact on the development of the entire Soviet society, and also modeled and laid the foundations of that command- the administrative system in the country, which finally took shape in the second half of the 1930s.

In Western historiography, there are still two main assessments of the results and consequences of the policy of War Communism. One part of Sovietologists (G. Janey, S. Malle) traditionally speaks of the unconditional collapse of the economic policy of War Communism, which led to complete anarchy and total collapse of the country's industrial and agricultural economy. Other Sovietologists (M. Levin), on the contrary, argue that the main results of the policy of War Communism were etatization (a gigantic strengthening of the role of the state) and archaization of socio-economic relations.

As for the first conclusion of Professor M. Levin and his colleagues, there can hardly be any doubt that during the years of "war communism" there was a gigantic strengthening of the entire party-state apparatus of power in the center and in the localities. But what concerns the economic results of "war communism", then the situation here was much more complicated, because:

On the one hand, "war communism" swept away all the former remnants of the medieval system in the agrarian economy of the Russian countryside;

On the other hand, it is also quite obvious that during the period of "war communism" there was a significant strengthening of the patriarchal peasant community, which allows us to speak of a real archaization of the country's national economy.

According to a number of contemporary authors (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov, S. Pavlyuchenkov), it would be a mistake to try to statistically determine the negative consequences of "war communism" for the national economy of the country. And the point is not only that these consequences cannot be separated from the consequences of the Civil War itself, but that the results of "war communism" are not quantitative, but qualitative, the essence of which is the very change in the socio-cultural stereotype of the country and its citizens.

According to other contemporary authors (S. Kara-Murza), “war communism” has become a way of life and a way of thinking for the overwhelming majority of Soviet people. And since it fell on the initial stage of the formation of the Soviet state, at its "infancy", it could not but have a huge impact on its entirety and became the main part of the very matrix on the basis of which the Soviet social system was reproduced.

IV. The problem of determining the main features of "war communism".

a) total destruction of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the domination of a single state form of ownership throughout the country;

b) the total elimination of commodity-money relations, the system of monetary circulation and the creation of an extremely rigid planned economic system in the country.

In the firm opinion of these scholars, the main elements of the policy of War Communism, the Bolsheviks borrowed from the practical experience of imperial Germany, where since January 1915 the following actually existed:

a) the state monopoly on the most important food and consumer goods;

b) their normalized distribution;

c) general labor service;

d) fixed prices for the main types of goods, products and services;

e) the allotment method of withdrawing grain and other agricultural products from the agricultural sector of the country's economy.

Thus, the leaders of "Russian Jacobinism" made full use of the forms and methods of governing the country, which they borrowed from capitalism, which was in an extreme situation during the war.

The most visible proof of this conclusion is the famous "Draft Party Program", written by V.I. Lenin in March 1918, which contained main features of the future policy of war communism:

a) the elimination of parliamentarism and the unification of the legislative and executive branches of power in the Councils of all levels;

b) the socialist organization of production on a national scale;

c) management of the production process through trade unions and factory committees, which are under the control of Soviet authorities;

d) the state monopoly of trade, and then its complete replacement by systematically organized distribution, which will be carried out by unions of commercial and industrial employees;

e) forced unification of the entire population of the country into consumer-production communes;

f) the organization of competition between these communes for a steady increase in labor productivity, organization, discipline, etc.

The Bolsheviks themselves, in particular, Yuri Zalmanovich Larin (Lurie), who published his work State Wartime Capitalism in Germany in 1928, wrote directly that the leadership of the Bolshevik Party had turned the organizational forms of the German bourgeois economy into the main instrument for establishing the proletarian dictatorship. (1914―1918) ". Moreover, a number of modern historians (S. Pavlyuchenkov) argue that "war communism" was a Russian model of German military socialism or state capitalism. Therefore, in a certain sense, "war communism" was a pure analogue of the traditional "Westernism" in the Russian political environment, with the only significant difference that the Bolsheviks managed to tightly envelop this political course in a veil of communist and phraseology.

In Soviet historiography (V. Vinogradov, I. Brekhin, E. Gimpelson, V. Dmitrenko), the whole essence of the policy of War Communism was traditionally reduced only to the main economic measures carried out by the Bolshevik Party in 1918-1920.

A number of modern authors (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov, V. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov, S. Pavlyuchenkov, E. Gimpelson) pay special attention to the fact that the radical breakdown of economic and social relations was accompanied by a radical political reform and the establishment of a one-party dictatorship in country.

Other modern scholars (S. Kara-Murza) believe that the main feature of "war communism" was the shift of the center of gravity of economic policy from the production of goods and services to their equal distribution. It is no coincidence that L.D. Trotsky, speaking about the policy of War Communism, frankly wrote that "We nationalized the disorganized economy of the bourgeoisie and established the regime of" consumer communism "in the most acute period of the struggle against the class enemy." All other signs of "war communism", such as the famous food appropriation system, the state monopoly in the sphere of industrial production and banking services, the elimination of commodity-money relations, universal labor service and the militarization of the country's economy, were structural features of the military-communist system, which in specific historical conditions was typical for the Great French Revolution (1789―1799), and for Kaiser Germany (1915―1918), and for Russia during the Civil War (1918―1920).

2. The main features of the policy of "war communism"

In the opinion of the overwhelming majority of historians, the main features of the policy of war communism, which were finally formulated in March 1919 at the VIII Congress of the RCP (b), were:

a) The policy of "food dictatorship" and surplus appropriation

According to a number of modern authors (V. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov), the Bolsheviks did not immediately come to the idea of \u200b\u200bsurplus appropriation, and initially were going to create a state grain procurement system based on traditional market mechanisms, in particular, by significantly increasing prices for grain and other agricultural products. ... In April 1918, in his report "On the Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power," V.I. Lenin bluntly stated that the Soviet government would pursue the previous food policy in accordance with the economic course, the outlines of which were determined in March 1918. In other words, it was about maintaining the grain monopoly, fixed grain prices and the traditional system of commodity exchange that had long existed between the city and the village. However, already in May 1918, due to a sharp aggravation of the military-political situation in the main grain-producing regions of the country (Kuban, Don, Little Russia), the position of the country's top political leadership changed radically.

In early May 1918, according to the report of the People's Commissar for Food A.D. Tsyurup members of the Soviet government for the first time discussed a draft decree on the introduction of a food dictatorship in the country. And although a number of members of the Central Committee and the leadership of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, in particular L.B. Kamenev and A.I. Rykov and Yu.Z. Larin, opposed this decree, on May 13 it was approved by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR and was formalized in the form of a special decree "On granting the people's food commissioner extraordinary powers to fight the village bourgeoisie." In mid-May 1918, a new decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee "On the organization of food detachments" was adopted, which, together with the commissars, were to become the main tool for knocking out scarce food resources from tens of millions of peasant farms in the country.

At the same time, in the development of this decree, the SNK and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopt decree "On the reorganization of the People's Commissariat of Food of the RSFSR and local food authorities", in accordance with which a complete restructuring of this department of the country was carried out in the center and in the field. In particular, this decree, which is quite rightly dubbed "The bankruptcy of the idea of \u200b\u200blocal councils":

a) established the direct subordination of all provincial and uyezd food structures not to the organs of Soviet power on the ground, but to the People's Commissariat of Food of the RSFSR;

b) determined that within the framework of this People's Commissariat a special Directorate of the Food Army would be created, which would be responsible for the implementation of the state grain procurement plan throughout the country.

Contrary to the traditional opinion, the very idea of \u200b\u200bfood detachments was not an invention of the Bolsheviks, and the palm should still be given to the Februaryists, so “dear to the heart” of our liberals (A. Yakovlev, E. Gaidar). As early as March 25, 1917, the Provisional Government, having issued a law "On the transfer of grain to the state," introduced a state monopoly on bread throughout the country. But since the plan of state grain procurements was carried out very badly, in August 1917 special military detachments began to form from the marching units of the active army and the rear garrisons to carry out forced requisitions of food and fodder, which became the prototype of the very Bolshevik food detachments that arose during the Civil War.

The activities of the food detachments still evoke absolutely opposite assessments.

Some historians (V. Kabanov, V. Brovkin) believe that in fulfilling the grain procurement plans, most of the food detachments were engaged in general robbery of all peasant farms, regardless of their social status.

Other historians (G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov, S. Kara-Murza) argue that, contrary to popular speculation and legends, the food detachments, having announced a crusade to the village for bread, did not plunder peasant farms, but achieved tangible results exactly where bread was obtained through the traditional exchange of goods.

After the beginning of the frontal Civil War and foreign intervention, the SNK and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR on June 11, 1918, adopted the famous decree "On the organization and supply of the committees of the village poor", or kombedah, which a number of modern authors (N. Dementyev, I. Dolutsky) called the trigger war.

For the first time, the very idea of \u200b\u200borganizing kombedov sounded at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in May 1918 from the lips of its chairman Ya.M. Sverdlov, who motivated the need to create them in order to incite "Second social war" in the countryside and a merciless struggle against the class enemy in the person of the rural bourgeois - the village "bloodsucker and world-eater" - the kulak. Therefore, the process of organizing kombedov, which V.I. Lenin regarded it as the greatest step of the socialist revolution in the countryside, proceeded at a rapid pace, and by September 1918, more than 30 thousand commissaries had been created throughout the country, the backbone of which was village idleness.

The main task of the commissars was not only the struggle for bread, but also the crushing of the volost and district bodies of Soviet power, which consisted of the wealthy strata of the Russian peasantry and could not be the organs of the proletarian dictatorship in the localities. Thus, their creation not only became the trigger for the Civil War, but also led to the actual destruction of Soviet power in the countryside. In addition, as noted by a number of authors (V. Kabanov), the commissars, having failed to fulfill their intended historical mission, gave a powerful impetus to chaos, devastation and impoverishment of the Russian countryside.

In August 1918, the SNK and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopted a package of new regulations, which marked the creation of a whole system of emergency measures to seize grain in favor of the state, including the decrees “On Involving Workers Organizations in Procurement of Bread”, “On Organization of Harvesting and Harvesting -requisition detachments "," Regulations on the barrage requisition food detachments ", etc.

In October 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR adopted a new decree "On imposing a tax in kind on farmers in the form of deducting part of agricultural products." Some scientists (V. Danilov), without sufficient grounds, expressed the idea of \u200b\u200ba genetic connection between this decree and the tax in kind in 1921, which laid the foundation for the NEP. However, the majority of historians (G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov) rightly argue that this decree marked the rejection of the "normal" taxation system and the transition to a system of "emergency" taxation, built on the class principle. In addition, according to the same historians, it was from the end of 1918 that a clear turn of the entire Soviet state machine from a disordered "emergency" to organized and centralized forms of "economic and food dictatorship" in the country was marked.

The crusade against the kulak and the rural world-eater, announced by this decree, was greeted with enthusiasm not only by the rural poor, but also by the overwhelming mass of the average Russian peasantry, whose number was more than 65% of the total rural population of the country. The mutual attraction of the Bolsheviks and the middle peasantry, which arose at the turn of 1918-1919, predetermined the fate of the commissars. Already in November 1918, at the VI All-Russian Congress of Soviets, under pressure from the communist faction itself, which was then headed by L.B. Kamenev, a decision is being made to restore a uniform system of bodies of Soviet power at all levels, which, in fact, meant the elimination of the commissars.

In December 1918, the 1st All-Russian Congress of Land Departments, Communes and Combedes adopted a resolution "On the collectivization of agriculture", which clearly outlined a new course towards the socialization of individual peasant farms and their transfer to large-scale agricultural production built on socialist principles. This resolution, as V.I. Lenin and People's Commissar of Agriculture S.P. Sereda, was greeted with hostility by the overwhelming mass of the multimillion-dollar Russian peasantry. This situation forced the Bolsheviks to change the principles of food policy again and on January 11, 1919, to issue the famous decree "On the food appropriation of grain and fodder."

Contrary to traditional public opinion, the surplus appropriation system in Russia was introduced not at all by the Bolsheviks, but by the tsarist government of A.F. Trepov, which in November 1916, at the suggestion of the then Minister of Agriculture A.A. Rittich issued a special decree on this issue. Although, of course, the surplus appropriation of the 1919 sample differed significantly from the surplus appropriation of the 1916 sample.

According to a number of modern authors (S. Pavlyuchenkov, V. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov), contrary to the prevailing stereotype, the surplus appropriation system became not a tightening of the food dictatorship in the country, but its formal weakening, since it contained a very important element: the initially set size of state needs for bread and forage. In addition, as Professor S.G. Kara-Murza, the scale of the Bolshevik allotment was about 260 million poods, while the tsar's allotment was more than 300 million poods of grain per year.

At the same time, the surplus appropriation itself proceeded not from the real possibilities of peasant farms, but from state needs, since in accordance with this decree:

The entire amount of grain, fodder and other agricultural products, which the state needed to supply the Red Army and cities, was distributed among all the grain-producing provinces of the country;

In all peasant farms that fell under the milk of the surplus appropriation, a minimum amount of edible, fodder and seed grain and other agricultural products remained, and all other surpluses were subject to complete requisition in favor of the state.

On February 14, 1919, the position of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR "On socialist land management and on measures of transition to socialist agriculture" was published, but this decree was no longer of fundamental importance, since the bulk of the Russian peasantry, rejecting collective "commune", made a compromise with the Bolsheviks, agreeing to a temporary food appropriation, which was considered the lesser evil. Thus, by the spring of 1919, from the list of all Bolshevik decrees on the agrarian question, only the decree "On food appropriation" remained, which became the backbone of the entire policy of war communism in the country.

Continuing the search for mechanisms that can force a significant part of the Russian peasantry to voluntarily surrender agricultural and industrial products to the state, the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR issue new decrees "On benefits for collecting tax in kind" (April 1919) and "On compulsory exchange of goods" (August 1919 .). They did not have much success with the peasants, and already in November 1919, by decision of the government, new appropriations were introduced on the territory of the country - potato, wood, fuel and feed.

According to a number of authoritative scientists (L. Lee, S. Kara-Murza), only the Bolsheviks were able to create a workable requisition-supplying food apparatus, which saved tens of millions of people in the country from starvation.

b) The policy of total nationalization

To implement this historic task, which was a direct continuation of the "Red Guard attack on capital", the SNK and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR issued a number of important decrees, including "On the nationalization of foreign trade" (April 1918), "On the nationalization of large industry and enterprises railway transport "(June 1918) and" On the establishment of the state monopoly on domestic trade "(November 1918). In August 1918, a decree was passed that created unprecedented benefits for all state-owned industrial enterprises, since they were exempted from the so-called "indemnity" - emergency state taxes and all municipal fees.

In January 1919, the Central Committee of the RCP (b), in its "Circular Letter" addressed to all party committees, bluntly stated that at the moment the main source of income for the Soviet state should be "Nationalized industry and state agriculture". In February 1919, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee called on the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the RSFSR to accelerate the further restructuring of the country's economic life on a socialist basis, which actually gave rise to a new stage of the proletarian state's offensive against the enterprises of "medium private business" that retained their independence, the authorized capital of which did not exceed 500 thousand rubles. In April 1919, a new decree was issued by the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR "On the handicraft and craft industry", according to which these enterprises were not subject to total confiscation, nationalization and municipalization, except in special cases by a special resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the RSFSR.

However, already in the fall of 1920, a new wave of nationalization began, which mercilessly hit small-scale industrial production, that is, all handicrafts and handicrafts, into which millions of Soviet citizens were drawn. In particular, in November 1920, the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council headed by A.I. Rykov adopted a resolution "On the nationalization of small industry", under the influence of which 20 thousand handicraft and craft enterprises of the country fell. According to historians (G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov, I. Ratkovsky, M. Khodyakov), by the end of 1920 the state concentrated in its hands 38 thousand industrial enterprises, of which more than 65% were handicraft and craft workshops.

c) Liquidation of commodity-money relations

Initially, the country's top political leadership tried to establish a normal exchange of goods in the country, having issued in March 1918 a special decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR "On the organization of trade between town and country." However, already in May 1918, a similar special instruction of the People's Commissariat of Food of the RSFSR (A.D. Tsyurupa) to this decree de facto abolished it.

In August 1918, in the midst of a new procurement campaign, having issued a whole package of decrees and tripling the fixed prices for grain, the Soviet government again tried to organize a normal exchange of goods. The township councils and councils of deputies, having monopolized in their hands the distribution of industrial goods in the countryside, practically immediately buried this good idea, causing the general anger of the multimillion Russian peasantry against the Bolsheviks.

Under these conditions, the country's top political leadership authorized the transition to exchange trade, or direct product exchange. Moreover, on November 21, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopted the famous decree "On organizing the supply of the population with all products and articles of personal consumption and households," according to which the entire population of the country was assigned to the "United Consumer Societies" through which it began to receive all food and industrial soldering. According to a number of historians (S. Pavlyuchenkov), this decree, in fact, completed the legislative registration of the entire military-communist system, the building of which will be brought to barracks perfection until the beginning of 1921. Thus, war communism policy with the adoption of this decree turned into the system of "war communism".

In December 1918, the II All-Russian Congress of Economic Councils called on the People's Commissar of Finance N.N. Krestinsky to take immediate measures to curtail money circulation throughout the country, but the leadership of the country's financial department and the People's Bank of the RSFSR (G.L. Pyatakov, Y.S. Ganetsky) evaded this decision.

Until the end of 1918 - early 1919. the Soviet political leadership still tried to refrain from a complete turn towards total socialization of the entire economic life of the country and the replacement of commodity-money relations by the naturalization of exchange. In particular, the communist faction of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, headed by the leader of the moderate Bolsheviks L.B. Kamenev, playing the role of an informal opposition to the government, created a special commission, which at the beginning of 1919 prepared a draft decree "On the restoration of free trade." This project met with stiff resistance from all members of the Council of People's Commissars, including V.I. Lenin and L.D. Trotsky.

In March 1919, a new decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR "On Consumer Communes" was issued, according to which the entire system of consumer cooperation with one stroke of the pen turned into a purely state institution, and the ideas of free trade were finally put to rest. And at the beginning of May 1919, the "Circular Letter" of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR was published, in which all government departments of the country were proposed to switch to a new system of settlements among themselves, that is, to record traditional monetary payments only in "accounting books", avoiding, if possible, cash operations among themselves.

For the time being V.I. Lenin nevertheless remained a realist on the issue of abolishing money and monetary circulation within the country, so in December 1919 he suspended the introduction of a draft resolution on the destruction of banknotes throughout the country, which the delegates of the VII All-Russian Congress of Soviets were supposed to accept. However, already in January 1920, by the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, the country's only credit and emission center, the People's Bank of the RSFSR, was abolished.

According to the majority of Russian historians (G. Bordyugov, V. Buldakov, M. Gorinov, V. Kabanov, V. Kozlov, S. Pavlyuchenkov), a new major and final stage in the development of the military-communist system was the IX Congress of the RCP (b), held in March - April 1920. At this party congress, all the top political leaders of the country quite consciously decided to continue the policy of war communism and build socialism in the country as soon as possible.

In the spirit of these decisions, in May - June 1920 there was an almost complete naturalization of the wages of the overwhelming majority of the country's workers and employees, which N.I. Bukharin ("Program of the Bolshevik Communists") and E.A. Shefler ("Naturalization of wages") as early as 1918 was considered the most important condition "Building a communist money-free economy in the country." As a result, by the end of 1920, the in-kind part of the average monthly wage in the country amounted to almost 93%, and the cash payment for housing, all utilities, public transport, medicines and consumer goods was completely abolished. In December 1920, the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopted a number of important decrees to this effect - "On free leave for the population of food products," "On free leave for the population of consumer goods," "On the abolition of monetary payments for the use of mail, telegraph, telephone and by radiotelegraph "," On the abolition of payments for drugs dispensed from pharmacies ", etc.

Then V.I. Lenin drew up for the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR a draft resolution "On the abolition of monetary taxes and the transformation of the surplus appropriation system into a tax in kind", in which he directly wrote that "The transition from money to moneyless product exchange is indisputable and is only a matter of time."

d) Militarization of the national economy and the creation of labor armies

Their opponents (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov) deny this fact and believe that the entire top political leadership, including V.I. Lenin, which is clearly indicated by the theses of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) "On the mobilization of the industrial proletariat, labor service, the militarization of the economy and the use of military units for economic needs", which were published in Pravda on January 22, 1920.

These ideas, embodied in the theses of the Central Committee, L.D. Trotsky not only supported, but also creatively developed in his famous speech at the IX Congress of the RCP (b), held in March - April 1920, the overwhelming majority of the delegates of this party forum, despite the sharp criticism of the Trotskyist economic platform from A.I. Rykov, D.B. Ryazanov, V.P. Milyutin and V.P. Nogin, they supported her. It was not at all about temporary measures caused by the Civil War and foreign intervention, but about a long-term political course that will lead to socialism. All the decisions made at the congress, including its resolution "On the transition to a militia system in the country", clearly spoke of this.

The very process of militarization of the country's national economy, which began at the end of 1918, proceeded rather quickly, but gradually and reached its apogee only in 1920, when War Communism entered its final, "militaristic" phase.

In December 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR approved the Code of Labor Laws, according to which universal labor service was introduced throughout the country for citizens over 16 years of age.

April 1919 two resolutions of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, according to which:

a) universal labor service was introduced for all able-bodied citizens aged 16 to 58;

b) special forced labor camps were created for those workers and civil servants who voluntarily switched to another job.

The strictest control over the observance of labor service was initially entrusted to the organs of the Cheka (F.E.Dzerzhinsky), and then to the Main Committee for General Labor Service (L.D. Trotsky). In June 1919, the previously existing department of the labor market of the People's Commissariat of Labor was transformed into a department for accounting and distribution of labor, which spoke eloquently for itself: now a whole system of forced labor was created in the country, which became the prototype of the notorious labor armies.

In November 1919 the SNK and STO RSFSR adopted the provisions "On Workers' Disciplinary Courts" and "On the Militarization of State Institutions and Enterprises", according to which the administration and trade union committees of factories, factories and institutions were given full right not only to dismiss workers from enterprises but also send them to concentration labor camps. In January 1920, the Council of People's Commissars and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopted the decree “On the procedure for universal labor service”, which provided for the involvement of all able-bodied citizens in the performance of various public works necessary to maintain the country's communal and road infrastructure in proper order.

Finally, in February - March 1920, by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and the SNK of the RSFSR, the creation of the notorious labor armies began, the main ideologist of which was L.D. Trotsky. In his note "The next tasks of economic construction" (February 1920), he came up with the idea of \u200b\u200bcreating provincial, district and volost labor armies, built like the Arakcheev military settlements. Moreover, in February 1920 by the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR L.D. Trotsky was appointed chairman of the interdepartmental commission on labor conscription, which included almost all the heads of the central people's commissariats and departments of the country: A.I. Rykov, M.P. Tomsky, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, V.V. Schmidt, A.D. Tsyurupa, S.P. Sereda and L.B. Krasin. A special place in the work of this commission was occupied by the issues of manning labor armies, which were to become the main tool for building socialism in the country.

e) Total centralization of management of the national economy of the country

In April 1918, Aleksey Ivanovich Rykov became the head of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, under whose leadership its structure was finally created, which existed throughout the entire period of war communism. Initially, the structure of the Supreme Council of the National Economy included: the Supreme Council of Workers' Control, branch departments, a commission of economic people's commissariats and a group of economic experts, consisting mainly of bourgeois specialists. The leading link of this body was the Bureau of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, which included all the heads of departments and an expert group, as well as representatives of four economic people's commissariats - finance, industry and trade, agriculture and labor.

From this time The Supreme Council of the National Economy of the RSFSR, as the country's main economic department, coordinated and directed the work:

1) all economic people's commissariats - industry and trade (LB Krasin), finance (NN Krestinsky), agriculture (S.P. Sereda) and food (A.D. Tsyurupa);

2) special meetings on fuel and metallurgy;

3) bodies of workers' control and trade unions.

The competence of the Supreme Economic Council and its local bodies, that is, regional, provincial and district economic councils, included:

Confiscations (gratuitous seizure), requisitions (seizure at fixed prices) and sequestration (deprivation of the right of disposal) of industrial enterprises, institutions and individuals;

Compulsory syndication of industries and trade that have retained their economic independence.

By the end of 1918, when the third stage of nationalization was completed, an extremely tough system of economic and economic management had developed in the country, which received a very capacious and accurate name - "glavkism". According to a number of historians (V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov), it was this "glavkism", which was based on the idea of \u200b\u200btransforming state capitalism into a real mechanism for the planned management of the country's national economy under the state dictatorship of the proletariat, and became the apotheosis of "war communism."

By the beginning of 1919, all sectoral departments, transformed into the Main Directorates of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, endowed with economic and administrative functions, completely enclosed the whole range of issues related to the organization of planning, supply, distribution of orders and sale of finished products of most industrial, trade and cooperative enterprises of the country. ... By the summer of 1920, within the framework of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, 49 branch central administrations were created - Glavtorf, Glavtop, Glavkozha, Glavzerno, Glavkrakhmal, Glavtrud, Glavkustprom, Tsentrokhladboynya and others, in the depths of which there were hundreds of production and functional departments. These chapters and their sectoral departments carried out direct management of all state enterprises in the country, regulated relations with small, handicraft and cooperative industries, coordinated the activities of related industries of industrial production and supply, were engaged in the distribution of orders and finished products. It became quite obvious that a number of vertical economic associations (monopolies), isolated from each other, had arisen, the relationship between which depended exclusively on the will of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy and its leader. In addition, within the framework of the Supreme Economic Council itself, there were many functional bodies, in particular the financial and economic, financial and accounting and scientific and technical departments, the Central Production Commission and the Bureau for the Accounting of Technical Forces, which completed the entire framework of the system of total bureaucracy that struck the country by the end Civil War.

In the conditions of the Civil War, a number of the most important functions previously belonging to the Supreme Council of the National Economy were transferred to various emergency commissions, in particular the Extraordinary Commission for the Supply of the Red Army, (Chrezkomsnab), the Emergency Authorized Defense Council for the Supply of the Red Army (Chusosnabarm), the Central Council for Military Procurements (Tsentrovoenzag), Military Industry Council (Industrial Military Council), etc.

f) Creation of a one-party political system

According to many modern historians (U. Rosenberg, A. Rabinovich, V. Buldakov, V. Kabanov, S. Pavlyuchenkov), the term "Soviet power" that came into historical science from the field of party propaganda in no way can claim to be adequate the structure of political power that was established in the country during the Civil War.

According to the same historians, the actual rejection of the Soviet system of state administration of the country occurred in the spring of 1918, and from that time the process of creating an alternative apparatus of state power through party channels began. This process, first of all, was expressed in the widespread creation of Bolshevik party committees in all volosts, uyezds and provinces of the country, which, together with the commanders and bodies of the Cheka, completely disorganized the activities of Soviets at all levels, turning them into appendages of party administrative authorities.

In November 1918, a timid attempt was made to restore the role of the organs of Soviet power in the center and in the localities. In particular, at the VI All-Russian Congress of Soviets, decisions were made on the restoration of a unified system of Soviet power bodies at all levels, on the exact observance and strict implementation of all decrees issued by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, which in March 1919 after the death of Ya.M. Sverdlov was headed by Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, but these good wishes remained on paper.

In connection with the assumption of the functions of the highest state administration of the country, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) itself was transformed. In March 1919, by decision of the VIII Congress of the RCP (b) and in pursuance of its resolution "On the organizational question", several permanently working bodies were created within the Central Committee, which V.I. Lenin in his famous work "Childhood Illness of" Leftism "in Communism" called the real party oligarchy - the Political Bureau, the Organizational Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. At the organizational plenum of the Central Committee, which took place on March 25, 1919, the personal composition of these higher party bodies was approved for the first time. The Politburo of the Central Committee, which was charged with the right "Make decisions on all issues that do not tolerate delay", included five members - V.I. Lenin, L.D. Trotsky, I.V. Stalin, L.B. Kamenev and N.N. Krestinsky and three candidate members - G.E. Zinoviev, N.I. Bukharin and M.I. Kalinin. To the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee, which was supposed to "Direct the entire organizational work of the party", also included five members - I.V. Stalin, N.N. Krestinsky, L.P. Serebryakov, A.G. Beloborodov and E.D. Stasov and one candidate for membership - M.K. Muranov. The Secretariat of the Central Committee, which at that time was entrusted with all the technical preparation of meetings of the Politburo and the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, included one executive secretary of the Central Committee, E.D. Stasov and five technical secretaries from among the experienced party workers.

After the appointment of I.V. Stalin as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), it is these party bodies, especially the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, that will become the real bodies of the highest state power in the country, which will retain their enormous powers up to the XIX Party Conference (1988) and XXVIII Congress of the CPSU (1990).

At the end of 1919, a broad opposition to administrative centralism arose within the party itself, which was led by the "decis" headed by T.V. Sapronov. At the VIII conference of the RCP (b), held in December 1919, he spoke with the so-called platform of "democratic centralism" against the official party platform, which was represented by M.F. Vladimirsky and N.N. Krestinsky. The platform of the "deciists", which was actively supported by the majority of the delegates to the party conference, provided for a partial return to the Soviet state bodies of real power on the ground and the limitation of arbitrariness on the part of party committees at all levels and central government agencies and departments of the country. This platform was also supported at the 7th All-Russian Congress of Soviets (December 1919), where the main struggle against the supporters of "bureaucratic centralism" unfolded. In accordance with the decisions of the Congress, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee tried to become a real organ of state power in the country and at the end of December 1919 created a number of working commissions to develop the foundations of a new economic policy, one of which was headed by N.I. Bukharin. However, already in mid-January 1920, at his suggestion, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) proposed to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to abolish this commission and henceforth not to show unnecessary independence in these matters, but to coordinate them with the Central Committee. Thus, the course of the 7th All-Russian Congress of Soviets to revitalize the organs of Soviet power in the center and in the localities suffered a complete fiasco.

According to the majority of modern historians (G. Bordyugov, V. Kozlov, A. Sokolov, N. Simonov), by the end of the Civil War, the Soviet authorities were not only stricken with the diseases of bureaucracy, but actually ceased to exist as a system of state power in the country. The documents of the VIII All-Russian Congress of Soviets (December 1920) directly stated that the Soviet system is degrading into a purely bureaucratic, apparatus structure, when the real organs of power at the local level are not the Soviets, but their executive committees and the presidiums of the executive committees, in which the main role is played by party secretaries, who have fully assumed the functions of the organs of Soviet power at the local level. It is no coincidence that already in the summer of 1921, in his famous work "On the Political Strategy and Tactics of Russian Communists" I.V. Stalin wrote very frankly that the Bolshevik Party is the very "Order of the Swordsmen," which "It inspires and directs the activities of all organs of the Soviet state in the center and in the localities."

"War communism" is the policy of the Bolsheviks, which was carried out from 1918 to 1920 and led to the Civil War in the country, as well as to the sharp discontent of the population with the new government. As a result, Lenin was hastily forced to curtail this course, and to announce the beginning of a new policy (NEP). The term "War Communism" was coined by Alexander Bogdanov. Sowe begins the policy of War Communism in the spring of 1918. Subsequently, Lenin wrote that this was a necessary measure. In fact, such a policy was a logical and normal course from the point of view of the Bolsheviks, following from the goals of the Bolsheviks. And the civil war, born of war communism, only contributed to the further development of this idea.

The reasons for the introduction of War Communism are as follows:

• Creation of a state according to communist ideals. The Bolsheviks sincerely believed that they would be able to create a non-market society with a complete lack of money. For this, it seemed to them, terror was needed, and it could only be achieved by creating special conditions in the country.
• Full subordination of the country. To completely concentrate power in their hands, the Bolsheviks needed complete control over all state bodies, as well as over state resources. This could only be done by terror.

The issue of "war communism" is important in a historical sense for understanding what was happening in the country, as well as for the correct causal relationship of events. We will deal with this in this material.

What is "war communism" and what are its features?

War Communism is a policy pursued by the Bolsheviks from 1918 to 1920. In fact, it ended in the first third of 1921, or rather, at that moment it was finally curtailed, and the transition to the NEP was announced. This policy is characterized by the fight against private capital, as well as the establishment of total control over literally all spheres of human life, including over the sphere of consumption.

Historical reference

The last words in this definition are very important to understand - the Bolsheviks took control of the consumption process. For example, autocratic Russia controlled production, but consumption was allowed to flow. The Bolsheviks went further ... In addition, War Communism assumed:

• nationalization of private enterprise
• food dictatorship
• cancellation of trade
• universal labor service.

It is very important to understand which events were the cause and which were the consequences. Soviet historians say that War Communism was necessary because there was an armed struggle between the Reds and Whites, each of whom was trying to seize power. But in fact, first war communism was introduced, and as a result of the introduction of this policy, a war began, including a war with its own population.

What is the essence of the policy of War Communism?

The Bolsheviks, as soon as they seized power, seriously believed that they would be able to completely abolish money, and there would be a natural exchange of goods in the country on a class basis. But the problem was that the situation in the country was very difficult and here it was simply necessary to hold on to power, while socialism, communism, Marxism, and so on, was relegated to the background. This was due to the fact that at the beginning of 1918 there was gigantic unemployment in the country, and inflation was reaching 200 thousand percent. The reason for this is simple - the Bolsheviks did not recognize private property and capital. As a result, they nationalized and seized capital by terror. But instead they offered nothing! And here Lenin's reaction is indicative, who blamed ... ordinary workers for all the troubles of the events of 1918-1919. According to him, the people in the country are idlers, and they are to blame for the famine, for the introduction of the policy of war communism, and for the Red Terror.

The main features of War Communism in brief

• Introduction of food appropriation in agriculture. The essence of this phenomenon is very simple - forcibly taken away from the peasants practically everything that was produced by them. The decree was signed on January 11, 1919.
• Exchange between city and village. This is what the Bolsheviks wanted, and their "textbooks" on building communism and socialism spoke about it. In practice, this has not been achieved. But they managed to worsen the situation and provoke the anger of the peasants, which resulted in uprisings.
• Industry nationalization. The RCP naively believed that it was possible to build socialism in one year, remove all private capital, by nationalizing it for this. They carried out it, but it did not give results. Moreover, in the future, the Bolsheviks were forced to carry out the NEP in the country, which in many respects had features of denationalization.
• A ban on the lease of land, as well as the use of hired force for its cultivation. This is again one of the postulates of Lenin's "textbooks", but it led to the decline of agriculture and hunger.
• Complete abolition of private trade. Moreover, this cancellation was done even when it was obvious that it was harmful. For example, when there was an obvious shortage of grain in the cities and the peasants came and sold it, the Bolsheviks began to fight the peasants and apply punishment to them. As a result - hunger again.
• The introduction of labor service. Initially, they wanted to implement this idea for the bourgeois (rich), but they quickly realized that there were not enough people, and there was a lot of work. Then they decided to go further, and announced that everyone should work. All citizens from 16 to 50 years old were required to work, including in labor armies.
• Distribution of natural forms of payment, including for wages. The main reason for this step is terrible inflation. What cost 10 rubles in the morning could cost 100 rubles by evening, and 500 by the next morning.
• Privileges. The state provided free housing, public transport, did not charge utility bills and other payments.

War communism in industry

The main thing with which the Soviet government began is the nationalization of industry. Moreover, this process was proceeding at an accelerated pace. So, by July 1918, 500 enterprises were nationalized in the RSFSR, by August 1918 - more than 3 thousand, by February 1919 - more than 4 thousand. As a rule, they did nothing with the managers and owners of enterprises - they took away all the property and everything. Another thing is interesting here. All enterprises were subordinated to the military industry, that is, everything was done to defeat the enemy (whites). In this respect, the policy of nationalization can be understood as the enterprises that the Bolsheviks needed for the war. But among the nationalized factories and factories there were also purely civilian ones. But they were of little interest to the Bolsheviks. Such enterprises were withdrawn and closed until better times.

War communism in industry is characterized by the following events:

• Resolution "On the organization of supply". In fact, private trade and private supply were destroyed, but the problem was that no other was substituted for private supply. As a result, the supply collapsed completely. The decree was signed by the Council of People's Commissars on November 21, 1918.
• The introduction of labor service. At first, the labor works concerned only the "bourgeois elements" (autumn 1918), and then all able-bodied citizens from 16 to 50 years old were involved in the work (decree of December 5, 1918). To give coherence to this process, work books were introduced in June 1919. They actually attached the worker to a specific place of work, with no options to change him. By the way, these are exactly the books that are still in use today.
• Nationalization. By the beginning of 1919, all large and medium-sized private enterprises were nationalized in the RSFSR! In small business, the share of private owners was observed, but there were very few of them.
• Militarization of labor. This process was introduced in November 1918 in rail transport, and in March 1919 in river and sea transport. This meant that working in these industries was equated with serving in the armed forces. The corresponding laws were applied here.
• Decision of the 9th Congress of the RCP b of 1920 (late March - early April) on the transfer of all workers and peasants to the position of mobilized soldiers (labor army).

But on the whole, the main task was industry and the submission of its new power for the war with the whites. Have you managed to achieve this? No matter how much Soviet historians assured us that they succeeded, in fact the industry in these years was destroyed and finally finished off. This can be partly attributed to the war, but only partly. The whole trick is that the Bolsheviks' stake was on the city and industry, and they managed to win the Civil War only thanks to the peasantry, who, choosing between the Bolsheviks and Denikin (Kolchak), chose the Reds as the least evil.

All industry was subject to the central government in the person of the Glavkov. They concentrated on themselves 100% of the receipt of all industrial products, with the aim of its further distribution for the needs of the front.

War communism policy in agriculture

But the main events of those years took place in the countryside. And these events were very important and extremely deplorable for the country, since terror was deployed to obtain bread and everything necessary to provide the city (industry).

Organization of exchange of goods, mostly without money

On March 26, 1918, a special decree was adopted for the implementation of the PWC, which is known as "On the organization of trade." The trick is that despite the adoption of the decree, there was no functioning and real exchange of goods between the city and the countryside. It was not there, not because the law was bad, but because an instruction was attached to this law, which fundamentally contradicted the law and interfered with activity. This was the instruction of the People's Commissar of Food (People's Commissar of Prod).

At the initial stage of the formation of the USSR, it was customary for the Bolsheviks to accompany each law with instructions (by-laws). Very often these documents contradicted each other. Largely because of this, there were so many bureaucratic problems in the first years of the power of the Soviets.

Historical reference

What was it about the instructions of the People's Commissar for Prod? She completely prohibited any sale of grain in the region, except for cases when the region donated in full the amount of grain that was "recommended" by the Soviet government. Moreover, even in this case, it was supposed to be an exchange, not a sale. Instead of agricultural products, the products of industry and cities were offered. Moreover, the system was designed in such a way that most of this exchange was received by representatives of the authorities, who were engaged in “extortion” in the countryside in favor of the state. This led to a logical reaction - the peasants (even small landowners) began to shelter grain, and were extremely reluctant to give it to the state.

Seeing that it was impossible to get bread in the countryside peacefully, the Bolsheviks created a special detachment - ComBedy. These "comrades" were organizing a real terror in the village, knocking out by force what they needed. Formally, this concerned only rich peasants, but the problem is that no one knew how to define rich from not rich.

Emergency powers of the People's Commissar

The policy of War Communism was gaining momentum. The next important step took place on May 13, 1918, when a decree was passed that literally pushed the country into civil war. This decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee "On emergency powers." These powers were vested in the People's Commissar of Food. This decree was extremely idiotic. If you get away from the dry letters of the law and understand what it boiled down to, then this is what we come to: - a fist is any person who did not hand over grain as much as the state ordered him. That is, the peasant is told that he needs to surrender, conditionally, 2 tons of wheat. The rich peasant does not surrender, because it is not profitable for him - he simply hides. The poor man does not surrender, because he does not have This wheat. In the eyes of the Bolsheviks, both of these people are kulaks. This was actually a declaration of war on the entire peasant population. According to the most conservative estimates, the Bolsheviks recorded about 60% of the country's population as "enemies"!

For a greater demonstration of the horror of those days, I would like to quote Trotsky (one of the ideological inspirers of the revolution), which he voiced at the very beginning of the formation of the power of the Soviets:

Our party for the Civil War! The civil war needs bread. Long live the Civil War!

Trotsky L.D.

That is, Trotsky, just like Lenin (then there were no disagreements between them), advocated war communism, for terror and for war. Why? Because this was the only way to keep power, writing off all your mistakes and flaws in the war. By the way, many people still use this technique.

Food detachments and Combed

At the next stage, Food Squads (Food Squads) and ComBedy (Poor Committees) were created. It was on their shoulders that the task of weaning grain from the peasants fell. Moreover, a norm was established - a peasant could keep 192 kilograms of grain per person for himself. The rest was the surplus that had to be given to the state. These units performed their duties extremely reluctantly and undisciplined. Although at the same time they managed to collect a little over 30 million poods of grain. On the one hand, the figure is large, but on the other hand, within the framework of Russia, it is extremely negligible. And the ComBeds themselves often sold the taken away grain and grain, bought the right not to surrender the surplus from the peasants, and so on. That is, in a couple of months after the creation of these "units" the question arose about their liquidation, since they not only did not help, but interfered with the Soviet regime and further aggravated the situation in the country. As a result, at the next congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (in December 1918), the "Committees of the Poor" were liquidated.

The question arose - how to rationally justify this step for people? After all, not later than a couple of weeks before that, Lenin was proving to everyone that ComBeds are badly needed and without them it is impossible to govern the country. Kamenev came to the aid of the leader of the world proletariat. He said briefly - Combedes are no longer needed, since the need for them has disappeared.

Why did the Bolsheviks really take this step? It would be naive to believe that they felt sorry for the peasants who were tortured by the ComBeds. The answer is different. At this very time, the Civil War turned its back on the red. There was a real threat of White victory. In such a situation, it was necessary to turn to the peasants for help and support. But for this it was necessary to earn their respect and, no matter what, but love. Therefore, a decision was made - with the peasants you need to get along and put up with.

Major supply problems and complete destruction of private trade

By the middle of 1918, it became clear that the main task of War Communism had failed - the exchange of goods had failed. Moreover, the situation was complicated as famine began in many cities. Suffice it to say that most cities (including large cities) provided themselves with bread only by 10-15%. The rest of the townspeople were provided by the "bagmen".

The sackers are independent peasants, including the poor, who independently came to the city, where they sold bread and grain. Most often, these transactions were in-kind.

Historical reference

It would seem that the Soviet government should carry in its arms "bagmen" who save the city from hunger. But the Bolsheviks needed complete control (remember, I said at the beginning of this article that this control was established over everything, including consumption). As a result, the fight against the bagmen began ...

Complete destruction of private trade

On November 21, 1918, the decree "On the organization of supply" was issued. The essence of this law was that now only the People's Commissariat for Food had the right to provide the population with any goods, including bread. That is, any private sales, including the activities of "bagmen", were outlawed. Their goods were confiscated in favor of the state, and the merchants themselves were arrested. But in this quest to control all the Bolsheviks went very far. Yes, they completely destroyed private trade, leaving only the state, but the problem is that the state had nothing to offer the population! The supply of the city and the exchange of goods with the countryside was completely cut off! And it is no coincidence that during the civil war there were "red", there were "white" and there were, few people know, "green". The latter were representatives of the peasantry and defended its interests. The Greens did not see much difference between the Whites and the Reds, so they fought with everyone.

As a result, the measures that the Bolsheviks had been strengthening for two years began to weaken. And this was a forced measure, since people were tired of terror, in all its manifestations, and it was impossible to build a state on violence alone.

The results of the policy of war communism for the USSR

• A one-party system finally took shape in the country, and the Bolsheviks had all power.
• A non-market economy has been created in the RSFSR, completely controlled by the state, and in which private capital has been completely removed.
• The Bolsheviks gained control over all the country's resources. As a result, it was possible to establish power and win the war.
• Aggravation of contradictions between workers and peasants.
• The pressure on the economy, as the policies of the Bolsheviks led to social problems.

As a result, War Communism, which we briefly talked about in this material, completely failed. Rather, this policy fulfilled its historical mission (the Bolsheviks were consolidated in power thanks to terror), but it had to be hastily curtailed and passed to the NEP, otherwise the power could not be retained. The country is so tired of terror, which was the hallmark of the policy of War Communism.

Each revolution becomes the basis for a significant change in the rules of the political game in the state. In most situations, the new authorities require serious tightening of the screws. In Russia in 1917, this perfectly confirmed the government's desire to impose communism by force. Such a system was the official internal policy of the newly created Soviet state from 1917 to 1921. What was the policy of War Communism, let's briefly consider the main features.

In contact with

Main provisions

Its basis was the introduction of centralization of the economy on the principles of communism. This decision was confirmed by the Second Program adopted in 1919 at the VII Congress of the RCP (b), which officially determined the procedure for transition from to.

The reason for this decision was the economic crisis, in which the state found itself, having survived, in fact, a lost revolution and a bloody Civil War. The survival of the new system depended on its readiness to improve the quality of life of the population, which, in most cases, found itself below the poverty line. To implement the new economic course, the entire state was officially declared a "military camp".

Consider the main provisions of the policy of military terror , whose main goal was systematic destruction of commodity-money relations and entrepreneurship.

The essence of politics

What was the essence of the policy of War Communism. At the stage of the overthrow of the autocracy and the Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks relied simultaneously on the proletariat and the peasantry, regardless of the level of income. First, the new government decides on the choice of the main driving force of the new state, which will become the poorest strata of the population. In such a situation, well-to-do peasants cease to be of interest to the new government, so an internal policy was adopted, focused only on the "poor". This is what has received the name "War Communism".

War communism events:

• maximum centralization of the economy, both large and medium and even small;
• economic management was as centralized as possible;
• the introduction of a monopoly on all agricultural products, food appropriation;
• complete curtailment of commodity-money relations;
• a ban on private trade;
• militarization of labor.

The ideologists of the Soviet state immediately after the change of the regime in the country thought it right to introduce an economic system, which, from their point of view, was closest to the principles of complete economic equality - communism.

Attention!The introduction of new principles was implemented rigidly, meeting the active resistance of the country's citizens.

The main feature of this type of economic policy was an attempt to mobilize all the country's resources. Given the stake specifically on the poorest strata of the population, it actually helped to rally the part of the nation on which the stake was placed.

Labor service

Positive advocacy played a major role in the success. The population had the appearance of the prospect of free and gratuitous receipt of previously inaccessible benefits. The actual confirmation of such a possibility was the official refusal of mandatory payments: utilities, transport. The provision of free housing has played a colossal role. The combination of minimal social bonuses and strict control over the willingness to selflessly and free of charge is the main feature of War Communism. It was effective, given the colossal property stratification characteristic of imperialism.

Attention! As a result of this decision, an economic system was formed, the basis of which was the equalization of the rights of the entire population. Forceful methods were used to introduce new principles.

Why was this path chosen?

What were the real causes of War Communism. Its introduction was a risky but necessary decision. The leading reason was the tragic situation in the country against the backdrop of active popular unrest and the dire consequences of the First World War.

Other reasons also included:

1. in most regions.
2. Making a decision on the full mobilization at the state level of all the resources of the Soviet state.
3. Non-acceptance by a significant part of the population of a change of power, which required severe punitive measures

What steps have been taken

All activities were transferred to a paramilitary track. What's happened:

1. The food appropriation system introduced in 1919 presupposed the “spreading out” between all the provinces of the country's food needs. They had to donate all fodder and bread to a common resource.
2. The militarized "pickers" left the peasants only the minimum required to keep their livelihoods at a minimum.
3. Trading in bread and other items on the private level was prohibited and severely punished.
4. Labor service implied compulsory employment in industry or agriculture for every citizen of the country from 18 to 60 years old.
5. Production management and distribution of products was transferred to the state level.
6. Since November 1918, martial law was introduced on transport, which significantly reduced the level of mobility.
7. As part of the transition to communist rails, any utility bills, transport fees and other similar services were canceled.

After a short period of time, the decision was considered unsuccessful, and the New Economic Policy (NEP) replaced the policy of War Communism.

What is NEP

What united the NEP and War Communism was an attempt to find a way to improve the quality of life of the population, in fear of a new round in the development of revolutionary sentiments. The goal continued to be the restoration of the economy of the state destroyed by the shocks.

Three years of War Communism continued the policy of destruction. Full centralization, a reliance on the ability to work of the poorest strata of the population without tangible financial benefits from daily activities continued the collapse of industry and agriculture. Against the background of a difficult social situation, a decision was made to choose a completely alternative economic policy.

In this case, on the contrary, the focus was on pluralism and the development of private entrepreneurship. "Civil peace" and the absence of social catastrophes became the official direction of development. The introduction of the NEP at the X Congress of the RCP (b) completely overturned the economic principles of the country's development.The stake was placed on the middle class, primarily on the well-to-do part of the peasantry, which could restore its own economic level using the New Economic Policy. It was planned to cope with hunger and total unemployment by opening small industries. The principles of peaceful interaction between workers and peasants were finally introduced.

The leading factors in the recovery of the country's economy included:

• transfer of industrial production to private hands, creation of small private industrial production. Medium and large industry could not be frequent;
• the surplus appropriation system, which required the transfer of all the results of its activities to the state, was replaced by a tax in kind, which implied a partial transfer of the results of its work to the state while keeping the surplus as personal savings;
• return of the principles of monetary financial remuneration based on the results of work.

Policy results

In a short time, at the official state level, the results of war communism, a complete transfer of the economy to a war footing, were summed up. In reality, the adopted policy became the basis for terror.

The attempt of the state to create an economy on the principles of voluntary and gratuitous action of each citizen led to the final collapse of production and agriculture. This made it difficult to try to end the Civil War. The state was on the verge of complete collapse. Only the NEP helped to save the situation, allowing the population to partially regain the minimum financial stability.

The consequences of war communism later became the basis of the life of the Soviet state for many decades. These include the nationalization of the banking system, railway enterprises, the oil industry, medium and large industrial production. There was a mobilization of all the country's resources, which made it possible to win the Civil War. At the same time, a new round of impoverishment of the population began, the flourishing of corruption and speculation.

Question 1. Politics of War Communism

USSR during the NEP

Output

The conditions in which Russia found itself afterwards were difficult, but the basic methods proved to be quite effective, helping to completely centralize the economy. On the example of one state, it almost succeeded to introduce the communist principles of life. True, they acted only on condition of harsh punitive measures. Practice has shown the unviability of the chosen policy.

Prodrazvorstka
Diplomatic isolation of the Soviet government
Russian Civil War
The collapse of the Russian Empire and the formation of the USSR
War communism Institutions and organizations Armed formations Developments February - October 1917:

After October 1917:

Personalities Related Articles

War communism - the name of the internal policy of the Soviet state, carried out in 1918 - 1921. during the Civil War. Its characteristic features were the extreme centralization of economic management, the nationalization of large, medium and even small industry (in part), the state monopoly on many agricultural products, surplus appropriation, the prohibition of private trade, the curtailment of commodity-money relations, equalization in the distribution of material wealth, and the militarization of labor. This policy was consistent with the principles on the basis of which, according to the Marxists, a communist society was to emerge. In historiography, there are different opinions on the reasons for the transition to such a policy - some historians believed that this was an attempt to "introduce communism" by the command method, others explained it by the reaction of the Bolshevik leadership to the realities of the Civil War. The same contradictory assessments were given to this policy by the leaders of the Bolshevik Party themselves, who led the country during the Civil War. The decision to end military communism and the transition to NEP was made on March 15, 1921 at the X Congress of the RCP (b).

The main elements of "War Communism"

Liquidation of private banks and confiscation of deposits

One of the first actions of the Bolsheviks during the October Revolution was the armed seizure of the State Bank. The buildings of private banks were also seized. On December 8, 1917, the SNK Decree "On the abolition of the Noble Land Bank and the Peasant Land Bank" was adopted. Banking was declared a state monopoly by the decree "on the nationalization of banks" of December 14 (27), 1917. The nationalization of the banks in December 1917 was supported by the confiscation of funds from the population. All gold and silver in coins and ingots, paper money were confiscated if they exceeded the amount of 5,000 rubles and were acquired "unearned". For small deposits that remained unsecured, a rate of receipt of money from accounts of no more than 500 rubles per month was established, so that the unsecured balance was quickly eaten up by inflation.

Industry nationalization

Already in June-July 1917, "capital flight" began from Russia. The first to flee were foreign entrepreneurs who were looking for cheap labor in Russia: after the February Revolution, the establishment of an 8-hour working day by default, the struggle for higher wages, legalized strikes deprived entrepreneurs of their superprofits. The constantly unstable situation prompted many domestic industrialists to flee. But thoughts about the nationalization of a number of enterprises were visited by the not leftist Minister of Trade and Industry A.I. Konovalov even earlier, in May, and for other reasons: the constant conflicts of industrialists with workers, causing strikes on the one hand and lockouts on the other, disorganized the already the economy undermined by the war.

The Bolsheviks faced the same problems after the October Revolution. The first decrees of the Soviet government did not imply any transfer of "factories to workers", which is eloquently evidenced by the Provision on workers' control approved by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the SNK on November 14 (27), 1917, which specifically stipulated the rights of entrepreneurs. However, the new government also faced questions: what to do with abandoned businesses and how to prevent lockouts and other forms of sabotage?

Started as the adoption of ownerless enterprises, nationalization later turned into a measure to combat counter-revolution. Later, at the XI Congress of the RCP (b), L.D. Trotsky recalled:

... In Petrograd, and then in Moscow, where this wave of nationalization rushed, delegations from the Ural factories came to us. My heart ached: “What are we going to do? "We'll take something, but what will we do?" But from conversations with these delegations it became clear that military measures are absolutely necessary. After all, the director of the factory with all his staff, connections, office and correspondence is a real cell at one or another Ural, or St. Petersburg, or Moscow plant, - a cell of the very counter-revolution, - an economic cell, solid, solid, which is armed is fighting against us. Therefore, this measure was a politically necessary measure of self-preservation. We could switch to a more correct calculation of what we can organize, we could start an economic struggle only after we had secured for ourselves not an absolute, but at least a relative possibility of this economic work. From an abstract economic point of view, we can say that our policy was erroneous. But if we put it in the world situation and in the situation of our situation, then it was, from the point of view of political and military in the broad sense of the word, absolutely necessary.

The first was nationalized on November 17 (30), 1917, the factory of the Likinskaya manufactory partnership of A. V. Smirnov (Vladimir province). In total, from November 1917 to March 1918, according to the industrial and professional census of 1918, 836 industrial enterprises were nationalized. On May 2, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree on the Nationalization of the sugar industry, on June 20 - the oil industry. By the fall of 1918, 9542 enterprises were concentrated in the hands of the Soviet state. All large capitalist ownership of the means of production was nationalized by the method of gratuitous confiscation. By April 1919, almost all large enterprises (with more than 30 hired workers) were nationalized. By the beginning of 1920, medium-sized industry was also largely nationalized. A rigid centralized production management was introduced. To manage the nationalized industry was created.

Foreign trade monopoly

At the end of December 1917, foreign trade was placed under the control of the People's Commissariat of Trade and Industry, and in April 1918 it was declared a state monopoly. The merchant fleet was nationalized. The decree on the nationalization of the fleet declared the national indivisible property of Soviet Russia to the shipping enterprises belonging to joint-stock companies, mutual partnerships, trading houses and sole large entrepreneurs owning sea and river vessels of all types.

Compulsory labor service

Compulsory labor service was introduced, first for the “non-labor classes”. The Labor Code (Labor Code), adopted on December 10, 1918, established labor service for all citizens of the RSFSR. The decrees adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on April 12, 1919 and April 27, 1920 prohibited unauthorized transition to a new job and absenteeism, and established severe labor discipline at enterprises. The system of unpaid voluntary-forced labor on weekends and holidays in the form of “subbotniks” and “voskursniki” has also become widespread.

However, Trotsky's proposal to the Central Committee received only 4 votes against 11, the majority led by Lenin was not ready to change the policy, and the IX Congress of the RCP (b) adopted a course of "militarizing the economy."

Food dictatorship

The Bolsheviks continued the grain monopoly proposed by the Provisional Government and the surplus appropriation system introduced by the Tsarist government. On May 9, 1918, a decree was issued confirming the state monopoly of the grain trade (introduced by the provisional government) and prohibiting the private trade in grain. On May 13, 1918, the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars "On granting the people's food commissioner extraordinary powers to fight the village bourgeoisie, hiding and speculating grain reserves," established the main provisions of the food dictatorship. The purpose of the food dictatorship was the centralized procurement and distribution of food, suppression of the resistance of the kulaks and the fight against baggage. The People's Commissariat for Food received unlimited powers in the procurement of food. On the basis of a decree of May 13, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee established per capita consumption norms for peasants - 12 poods of grain, 1 pood of cereals, etc. - similar to the norms introduced by the Provisional Government in 1917. All grain exceeding these norms was to be transferred to the disposal of the state at prices set by it. In connection with the introduction of the food dictatorship in May-June 1918, the Food-requisitioning army of the RSFSR People's Commissariat for Food (Prodarmia) was created, consisting of armed food detachments. For the leadership of the Food Army on May 20, 1918, the Office of the Chief Commissioner and the military leader of all food detachments was created under the People's Commissariat of Education. To carry out this task, armed food detachments were created, endowed with emergency powers.

V.I. Lenin explained the existence of the surplus appropriation system and the reasons for refusing it:

The tax in kind is one of the forms of the transition from a kind of "war communism", forced by extreme poverty, ruin and war, to the correct socialist exchange of goods. And this latter, in turn, is one of the forms of the transition from socialism with the peculiarities caused by the predominance of the small peasantry in the population to communism.

A kind of "war communism" consisted in the fact that we actually took from the peasants all the surplus, and sometimes not even the surplus, but part of the food needed for the peasant, took to cover the costs of the army and the maintenance of the workers. They borrowed for the most part, for paper money. Otherwise, we could not defeat the landlords and capitalists in the ruined small-peasant country ... But it is no less necessary to know the real measure of this merit. War communism was forced by war and ruin. It was not and could not be a policy that meets the economic tasks of the proletariat. It was a temporary measure. The correct policy of the proletariat, exercising its dictatorship in a small-peasant country, is to exchange grain for industrial products necessary for the peasant. Only such a food policy meets the tasks of the proletariat, only it can strengthen the foundations of socialism and lead to its complete victory.

The tax in kind is a transition to it. We are still so ruined, so crushed by the oppression of the war (which happened yesterday and may flare up thanks to the greed and malice of the capitalists tomorrow), that we cannot give the peasant the products of industry for all the grain we need. Knowing this, we introduce a tax in kind, that is, the minimum necessary (for the army and for workers).

On July 27, 1918, the People's Commissariat for Food adopted a special decree on the introduction of a widespread class food ration, divided into four categories, providing for measures for accounting for stocks and distribution of food. At first, the class ration operated only in Petrograd, from September 1, 1918 - in Moscow - and then it was extended to the provinces.

Suppliers were divided into 4 categories (then 3): 1) all workers working in especially difficult conditions; breastfeeding mothers up to the 1st year of the child and nurses; pregnant women from the 5th month 2) all those working in hard work, but in normal (not harmful) conditions; women - housewives with a family of at least 4 people and children from 3 to 14 years old; disabled of the 1st category - dependents 3) all workers engaged in light work; female hostesses with a family of up to 3 people; children under 3 years old and adolescents 14-17 years old; all students over the age of 14; unemployed registered at the labor exchange; pensioners, invalids of war and labor, and other disabled persons of the 1st and 2nd categories, dependent 4) all males and females who receive income from hired labor of others; persons of the liberal professions and their families who are not in the public service; persons of undetermined occupation and all other population not named above.

The volume of issued was correlated by groups as 4: 3: 2: 1. First of all, products were dispensed simultaneously in the first two categories, in the second - in the third. Issuance for the 4th was carried out as the demand for the first 3 was satisfied. With the introduction of class cards, any others were abolished (the card system was in effect from mid-1915).

• Private enterprise ban.

• Elimination of commodity-money relations and the transition to direct commodity exchange regulated by the state. Withering away of money.

• Paramilitary Railroad Administration.

Since all of these measures were taken during the civil war, in practice they were much less coherent and coordinated than was planned on paper. Large areas of Russia were beyond the control of the Bolsheviks, and the lack of communications led to the fact that even the regions formally subordinate to the Soviet government often had to act independently, in the absence of centralized control from Moscow. The question still remains - was War Communism an economic policy in the full sense of the word, or just a set of disparate measures taken to win the civil war at any cost.

Results and assessment of war communism

The Supreme Council of the National Economy, created according to the project of Yuri Larin, as the central administrative planning body of the economy, became the key economic body of War Communism. According to his own recollections, Larin designed the main directorates (chapters) of the Supreme Council of the National Economy on the model of the German "Kriegsgesellschaften" (centers of industry regulation in wartime).

The Bolsheviks declared "workers' control" to be the alpha and omega of the new economic order: "the proletariat takes matters into its own hands." "Workers' control" very soon revealed its true nature. These words always sounded like the beginning of the destruction of the enterprise. All discipline was immediately destroyed. Power at the factory and plant passed to rapidly changing committees, in fact, to no one for anything not responsible. Knowledgeable, honest workers were driven out and even killed. Labor productivity declined inversely with the rise in wages. The attitude was often expressed in dizzying numbers: the board increased, and the productivity fell by 500-800 percent. Enterprises continued to exist only due to the fact that either the state, which owned the printing press, took on the workers, or the workers sold and devoured the basic capital of the enterprises. According to Marxist doctrine, the socialist revolution will be caused by the fact that the productive forces will outgrow the forms of production and, under the new socialist forms, will have the possibility of further progressive development, etc., etc. Experience has revealed all the falsity of these stories. Under the "socialist" order, there has been an extreme decline in labor productivity. Our productive forces under "socialism" regressed to the times of Peter's serf factories. Democratic self-government has completely destroyed our railways. With an income of 1½ billion rubles, the railways had to pay about 8 billion for the maintenance of workers and employees alone. Wanting to seize the financial power of "bourgeois society", the Bolsheviks with a Red Guard raid "nationalized" all the banks. In reality, they only acquired the few miserable millions that they managed to seize in the safes. But they destroyed credit and deprived industrial enterprises of all funds. So that hundreds of thousands of workers would not be left without earnings, the Bolsheviks had to open for them the cash office of the State Bank, which was strenuously replenished by the unrestrained printing of paper money.

Instead of the unprecedented growth of labor productivity expected by the architects of War Communism, its result was not an increase, but, on the contrary, a sharp drop: in 1920, labor productivity declined, including as a result of mass malnutrition, to 18% of the pre-war level. If before the revolution the average worker consumed 3820 calories per day, already in 1919 this figure fell to 2680, which was no longer enough for heavy physical labor.

Industrial output by 1921 had decreased threefold, and the number of industrial workers was cut in half. At the same time, the staff of the Supreme Council of the National Economy has grown by about a hundred times, from 318 people to 30 thousand; A glaring example was the Gasoline Trust, which was part of this body, which grew to 50 people, despite the fact that this trust had only one plant with 150 workers to manage.

Particularly difficult was the situation in Petrograd, whose population during the Civil War decreased from 2 million 347 thousand people. to 799 thousand, the number of workers decreased five times.

The decline in agriculture has become just as sharp. Due to the complete disinterest of the peasants to increase crops under the conditions of "war communism", grain production in 1920 fell in comparison with the pre-war level by half. According to Richard Pipes,

In such a situation, it was enough for the weather to deteriorate to cause famine in the country. Under the communist rule, there was no surplus in agriculture, therefore, if a crop failure occurred, there would be nothing to deal with its consequences.

To organize the surplus appropriation system, the Bolsheviks organized another greatly expanded body - the People's Commissariat for Food, headed by A.D. Tsyuryupa.Despite the efforts of the state to establish food supplies, a mass famine of 1921-1922 began, during which up to 5 million people died. The policy of "war communism" (especially the surplus appropriation system) aroused the discontent of broad strata of the population, especially the peasantry (the uprising in the Tambov region, Western Siberia, Kronstadt, and others). By the end of 1920, an almost continuous belt of peasant uprisings ("green flood") appeared in Russia, aggravated by huge masses of deserters, and the massive demobilization of the Red Army that began.

The difficult situation in industry and agriculture was aggravated by the final collapse of transport. The share of the so-called "sick" steam locomotives went from the pre-war 13% to 61% in 1921, transport was approaching the threshold, after which the capacity was to be enough only to service their own needs. In addition, firewood was used as fuel for steam locomotives, which were extremely reluctant to procure by peasants for labor.

The experiment of organizing labor armies in 1920-1921 also completely failed. The first labor army demonstrated, in the words of the chairman of its council (Predsovrudarm - 1) Trotsky L. D., “monstrous” (monstrously low) labor productivity. Only 10 - 25% of its personnel were engaged in labor activities as such, and 14%, due to torn clothes and lack of shoes, did not leave the barracks at all. Mass desertion from labor armies is widespread, which in the spring of 1921 finally gets out of control.

In March 1921, at the Tenth Congress of the RCP (B), the tasks of the policy of "war communism" were recognized by the country's leadership as fulfilled and a new economic policy was introduced. VI Lenin wrote: “'War communism' was forced by war and ruin. It was not and could not be a policy that meets the economic tasks of the proletariat. He was a temporary measure. " (Complete collection of works, 5th ed., Vol. 43, p. 220). Lenin also argued that "War Communism" should be given to the Bolsheviks not to blame, but to merit, but at the same time it is necessary to know the extent of this merit.

In culture

• Life in Petrograd during War Communism is described in Ayn Rand's novel We Are Alive.

Notes

1. Terra, 2008. - T. 1. - S. 301. - 560 p. - (Great encyclopedia). - 100,000 copies - ISBN 978-5-273-00561-7
2. See, for example: V. Chernov. The great Russian revolution. M., 2007
3. V. Chernov. The great Russian revolution. S. 203-207
4. The position of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on workers' control.
5. Eleventh Congress of the RCP (b). M., 1961.S. 129
6. Labor Code of 1918 // Appendix from the tutorial by I. Ya. Kiselev “Labor Law of Russia. Historical and Legal Research "(Moscow, 2001)
7. The Order-memo on the 3rd Red Army - 1st Revolutionary Army of Labor, in particular, said: “1. The 3rd Army has completed its combat mission. But the enemy is not yet completely broken on all fronts. The predatory imperialists are also threatening Siberia from the Far East. The Entente mercenary forces are also threatening Soviet Russia from the west. There are also White Guard gangs in Arkhangelsk. The Caucasus has not yet been liberated. Therefore, the 3rd Revolutionary Army remains under the bayonet, maintains its organization, its internal cohesion, its fighting spirit - in case the socialist fatherland calls it on to new combat missions. 2. But, imbued with a sense of duty, the 3rd Revolutionary Army does not want to waste time in vain. During those weeks and months of respite, which fell to her lot, she will use her forces and means for the economic advancement of the country. Remaining a fighting force, formidable to the enemies of the working class, it is at the same time turning into a revolutionary army of labor. 3. The Revolutionary Military Council of the 3rd Army is included in the Council of the Army of Labor. There, along with the members of the revolutionary military council, there will be representatives of the main economic institutions of the Soviet Republic. They will provide the necessary guidance in various fields of economic activity. " For the full text of the Order, see: Order-memo on the 3rd Red Army - 1st Revolutionary Army of Labor
8. In January 1920, in a pre-congress discussion, the Theses of the Central Committee of the RCP on the mobilization of the industrial proletariat, labor service, the militarization of the economy and the use of military units for household needs were published, paragraph 28 of which said: “As one of the transitional forms to military service and to the widest use of socialized labor should be used for labor purposes, which are freed from combat missions, military units, up to large army formations. This is the meaning of the transformation of the Third Army into the First Army of Labor and the transfer of this experience to other armies "(see IX Congress of the RCP (b). Stenographic report. Moscow, 1934, p. 529)
9. L. D. Trotsky The main questions of food and land policy: “In the same February 1920, L. D. Trotsky submitted to the Central Committee of the RCP (b) proposals to replace the surplus appropriation tax in kind, which actually led to the rejection of the policy of“ war communism “. These proposals were the results of a practical acquaintance with the situation and the mood of the village in the Urals, where in January-February Trotsky found himself as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic "
10. V. Danilov, S. Esikov, V. Kanishchev, L. Protasov. Introduction // Peasant uprising of the Tambov province in 1919-1921 "Antonovshchina": Documents and materials / Otv. Ed. V. Danilov and T. Shanin. - Tambov, 1994: It was proposed to overcome the process of “economic degradation”: 1) “replacing the withdrawal of surpluses with a certain percentage deduction (a kind of income tax in kind), so that a larger plowing or better cultivation would still be beneficial”, and 2) "By establishing a greater correspondence between the distribution of industrial products to the peasants and the amount of grain poured by them, not only in volosts and villages, but also in peasant households." As you know, this was the beginning of the new economic policy in the spring of 1921. "
11. See X Congress of the RCP (b). Stenographic report. Moscow, 1963.S. 350; XI Congress of the RCP (b). Stenographic report. Moscow, 1961.S. 270
12. See X Congress of the RCP (b). Stenographic report. Moscow, 1963.S. 350; V. Danilov, S. Esikov, V. Kanishchev, L. Protasov. Introduction // Peasant uprising of the Tambov province in 1919-1921 "Antonovshchina": Documents and materials / Otv. Ed. V. Danilov and T. Shanin. - Tambov, 1994: “After the defeat of the main forces of counterrevolution in the East and South of Russia, after the liberation of almost the entire territory of the country, a change in food policy became possible, and in terms of the nature of relations with the peasantry, it was necessary. Unfortunately, Leonid Trotsky's proposals to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) were rejected. The delay in canceling the surplus appropriation system for a whole year had tragic consequences, Antonovism as a massive social explosion could not have happened. "
13. See IX Congress of the RCP (b). Stenographic report. Moscow, 1934. On the report of the Central Committee on economic construction (p. 98), the congress adopted a resolution "On the immediate tasks of economic construction" (p. 424), in clause 1.1 of which, in particular, it was said: "Approving the theses of the Central Committee of the RCP on the mobilization of industrial the proletariat, labor service, the militarization of the economy and the use of military units for economic needs, the congress decides ... "(p. 427)
14. Kondratyev ND The bread market and its regulation during the war and revolution. - M .: Nauka, 1991 .-- 487 p.: 1 p. portr., ill., tab.
15. A.S. Outcast. SOCIALISM, CULTURE AND BOLSHEVISM

Literature

• Revolution and Civil War in Russia: 1917-1923 Encyclopedia in 4 volumes. - Moscow:

War communism is a kind of policy that was pursued in the period from 1918 to 1921 by the young Soviet state. It still causes a lot of controversy among historians. In particular, few can say unequivocally how justified it was (and whether it was). Some elements of politics are considered to be a response to the threat of the "white movement", others, presumably, caused by the Civil War. At the same time, the reasons for the introduction of War Communism boil down to several factors:

1. The coming to power of the Bolsheviks, who perceived the teachings of Engels and Marx literally as a program of action. Many, led by Bukharin, demanded that all communist measures be immediately implemented in the economy. They did not want to think about how realistic and feasible it was, how much it corresponded to reality. As well as the fact that Marx and Engels were more theorists who interpreted practice to suit their worldviews. In addition, they wrote with an orientation towards industrialized countries, where there were completely different institutions. Their theory did not take into account Russia.
2. Those who came to power lack real experience in managing a huge country. This was shown not only by the policy of war communism, but also by its results, in particular, a sharp reduction in production, a decrease in the volume of sowing, the loss of interest of peasants in agriculture. The state surprisingly quickly fell into an incredible decline, it was undermined.
3. Civil War. The immediate introduction of a number of measures was associated with the need to defend the revolution at any cost. Even if it meant hunger.

It is worth noting that Soviet historiographers, trying to justify what the policy of war communism assumed, talked about the deplorable state of the country in which the state was after the First World War and the reign of Nicholas II. However, there is a clear distortion here.

The fact is that 1916 at the front was quite favorable for Russia. He also had an excellent harvest. In addition, frankly speaking, military communism was not aimed primarily at saving the state. In many ways, this was a way to consolidate his power in both domestic and foreign policy. What is very typical for many dictatorial regimes, the characteristic features of the future Stalinist rule were laid even then.

The maximum centralization of the economic management system, which surpassed even the autocracy, the introduction of surplus appropriation, rapid hyperinflation, the nationalization of almost all resources and enterprises - these are far from all features. Obligatory labor appeared, which was largely militarized. Completely private trade is prohibited. In addition, the state tried to abandon commodity-money relations, which almost led the country to a complete disaster. However, a number of researchers believe that it did lead.

It should be noted that the main provisions of War Communism were based on equalization. An individual approach not only to a specific enterprise, but even to industries was destroyed. Therefore, a noticeable decrease in performance is quite natural. During the Civil War, this could have turned into a disaster for the new government, if it had lasted at least a couple more years. So historians believe the collapse was timely.

Food appropriation

War Communism is a highly controversial phenomenon in and of itself. However, few things caused as many conflicts as surplus appropriation. Its characteristics are quite simple: the Soviet authorities, experiencing a constant need for food, decided to organize something like a tax in kind. The main goals were the maintenance of the army opposing the "whites".

After the surplus appropriation system was introduced, the attitude of the peasants to the new government deteriorated. The main negative result was that many agrarians began to openly regret the monarchy, so they were not satisfied with the policy of war communism. That later served as an impetus for the perception of the peasantry, especially the well-to-do, as an element potentially dangerous for the communist form of government. We can say that as a result of the surplus appropriation, dispossession began. However, the latter in itself is too complex a historical phenomenon, so it is problematic to state anything unequivocally here.

In the context of the issue under discussion, groups of food detachments deserve separate mention. These people, who talked a lot about capitalist exploitation, did not treat the peasants any better. And the study of such a topic as the policy of war communism even briefly shows: often it was not the surplus that was taken away, but the main thing, the peasants were left completely without food. In fact, under the slogan of outwardly beautiful communist ideas, robbery took place.

What are the main measures of the policy of War Communism?

Nationalization played an important role in what was happening. Moreover, it concerned not only large or medium-sized enterprises, but even small ones belonging to certain sectors and (or) located in specific regions. At the same time, the policy of War Communism is characterized by the surprisingly low competence of those who tried to engage in management, weak discipline, and inability to organize complex processes. And the political chaos in the country only exacerbated the problems in the economy. The logical result was a sharp decrease in productivity: some factories reached the level of Peter's enterprises. Such results of the policy of War Communism could not but discourage the country's leadership.

What else characterized what was happening?

The goal of the policy of War Communism was ultimately meant to be order. However, very soon many contemporaries realized that the established regime was characterized differently: in some places it resembled a dictatorship. Many democratic institutions that appeared in the Russian Empire in the last years of its existence or were just beginning to emerge were strangled in the bud. By the way, a well-thought-out presentation can show this quite colorfully, because there was not a single sphere that was not affected in one way or another by War Communism. He strove to control everything.

At the same time, the rights and freedoms of individual citizens, including those for whom they allegedly fought, were ignored. Very soon the term war communism for the creative intelligentsia became something of a household name. It was during this period that the maximum disappointment with the results of the revolution fell. War Communism showed many the true face of the Bolsheviks.

Assessment

It should be noted that many are still arguing about how exactly this phenomenon should be evaluated. Some believe that the concept of War Communism was distorted by the war. Others believe that the Bolsheviks themselves were familiar with him only in theory, and when faced in practice, they were afraid that the situation might get out of control and turn against them.

In studying this phenomenon, a presentation can be of great help, in addition to the usual material. In addition, that time was literally full of posters, bright slogans. Some romantics of the revolution were still trying to ennoble it. That the presentation will just show.