Gorbachev and Yeltsin confrontation. Political Struggle and the Drama of Nations

30.07.2020

From chapter 5 "MS Gorbachev. Beginning of perestroika" of the book "The Sun at its Zenith".

From June 28 to July 1, 1988, the 19th All-Union Party Conference of the CPSU was held in Moscow.

The previous All-Union conference was held in the party 47 years ago.

Its main task, as we were then explained, is to answer the questions, what are the first results of perestroika, what should be done to remove the obstacles standing in its way, how to make the process of revolutionary renewal irreversible.

Conference agenda:

1. On the progress in implementing the decisions of the 27th Congress of the CPSU, the main results of the first half of the 12th five-year plan and the tasks of party organizations to deepen the process of perestroika.

2. On measures for further democratization of the party and society.
M.S. Gorbachev.

After four days of in-depth discussion, the conference participants adopted the following resolutions:

On the implementation of the decisions of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU and the tasks of deepening perestroika "

- "On the democratization of Soviet society and the reform of the political system",

- "On the fight against bureaucracy",

- "On interethnic relations",

- "On publicity",

- "On legal reform."

On July 1, 1988, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, First Deputy Chairman of the State Construction Committee, Minister of the USSR, spoke at an afternoon session.

His speech was perceived ambiguously, since it fundamentally differed from the general mood of the conference delegates, praise for perestroika.

At the evening meeting, some delegates asked to speak and expressed their attitude towards B.N. Yeltsin and his speech at the conference.

Among them:

Secretary of the Party Committee of the Sverdlovsk Machine-Building Plant named after M.I. Kalinina V.A. Volkov,

Director General of Research and Production Association "Machine-Tool Plant named after Sergo Ordzhonikidze" NS Chikirev,

First Secretary of the Proletarian District Committee of the CPSU in Moscow I.S. Lukin.

Thus, the confrontation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin escalated in mid-1988.

Before the act of abolition of the CPSU by Yeltsin B.N. there were just over three years left.

In the fall of 1988 M.S. Gorbachev carried out radical changes in the party apparatus and began to carry out political reform.

The old guard was retired: A.A. Gromyko, M.S. Solomentsev, V.I. Dolgikh, P.N. Demichev, A.F. Dobrynin.

New people appeared in the Politburo and other high posts: V.A. Medvedev, V.M. Chebrikov, A.V. Vlasov, A.P. Biryukova, A.I. Lukyanov, B.K. Pugo.

On October 1, 1988 in Moscow, at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, M.S. was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, retaining the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

A.I. was elected First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Lukyanov.

The post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR remained with N.I. Ryzhkov.

V.A. was appointed Chairman of the USSR State Security Committee. Kryuchkov.

On October 3, 1988, an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of the eleventh convocation took place.

Organizational issues were resolved on it.

Vorotnikov Vitaly Ivanovich was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

Alexander Vladimirovich Vlasov was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR.

But that's not all political reforms!

A Congress of People's Deputies was scheduled for April 1989, at which new bodies of state power were to be formed.

But for this it was necessary to revise legislative acts and amend the Constitution of the USSR.

Mikhail Gorbachev has steadfastly pursued a policy of political, economic and social reforms.

2010 Grateful

Reviews

I received Vlasov in our area. There are two photos left.
The chapter "All-Union Seminar-Conference" will be about his visit.
The man is phlegmatic. Democratically, the delegation traveled in buses. He slept most of the time.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution

higher professional education

"ULYANOVSK STATE TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY"

Department of History and Culture

in the discipline "History"

on the topic: “M.S. Gorbachev, B.N. Yeltsin as associates and political antipodes "

Completed:

Maltseva Yu.E.

Ulyanovsk

Introduction

Gorbachev M.S. in power

1 The beginning of the reign of M.S. Gorbachev

2 Gorbachev's reforms

The beginning of Yeltsin's rule

The collapse of the USSR

Yeltsin and Gorbachev: the struggle of the titans

Conclusion

Introduction

Gorbachev and Yeltsin are two of the most prominent Russian politicians of the late 20th century. Two people who played a key role in the Great anti-communist (in other words - liberal-democratic) revolution that took place in Russia in the late eighties - nineties of the last century. The paradox, however, lies in the fact that while doing, in fact, one great thing, these two were constantly in a tough confrontation with each other. This confrontation, of course, took away from both of them a lot of strength, but at the same time, it may have charged both of them with additional energy. This happens in any fight - military, sports ... Political. The passionate desire to defeat the enemy often includes some sources of strength previously unknown to the person himself.

In the case of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, at times it seemed that a struggle was being waged between them - for destruction, but in the end it turned out that it led to creation. Yes, the old, rotten, unviable communist regime was destroyed, but the road was opened to the construction of a democratic order that would save Russia, based on a market economy.

They were both systemic people. Otherwise, they would not have made a political career in the Soviet Union and would not have reached the very top. But this is, perhaps, all that brings them together. They became opponents, even antipodes. But most importantly, they were destined to play opposite roles.

The purpose of this work is to study the personalities of M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin, in determining the achievements and miscalculations in their activities as leaders.

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following tasks:

)study literary and other sources on the topic;

)analyze the found sources;

)to compare the different points of view of historians and public figures on the topic;

)identify positive and negative aspects in the activities of Russian politicians;

)present the results obtained in the course of the research in the form of an abstract work.

gorbachev Yeltsin politician perestroika

1. Gorbachev M.S. in power.

1 The beginning of the reign of M.S. Gorbachev

Graduate of the Faculty of Law of the Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov, M.S. Gorbachev is a theorist and intellectual, fascinated by the images of the ideological ought. His struggle for power and change is associated with maintaining a complex system of ideas, meanings and signs. At the same time, he, as an experienced courtier, carefully and consistently avoids any actions that, in his opinion, can unexpectedly and strongly destabilize the system. That is why the international activities of M.S. Gorbachev and the "glasnost" policy, which brought back the truth about Russian and Soviet history. But that's why he stops halfway when it comes to real economic change. The values \u200b\u200bof the socialist choice in practice come into irreconcilable contradiction with the principle of free market.

It should be remembered that Mikhail Gorbachev received the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party in general almost by accident and not at all because he was a famous reformer or a very principled person. On the contrary, he never shone with special talents and concrete achievements. But he was one of the youngest, talkative and charming party functionaries.

Remember: in just three or four years (1981-1985), first the last ideologist of the communist regime, Suslov, died, and then three successive General Secretaries - Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko. Without such a radical clearing of the Soviet political arena, fifty-four-year-old Gorbachev would never have become general secretary. Another dying general secretary in this situation would be an overkill. The Kremlin elders were already laughed at all over the world.

In addition, Mikhail Gorbachev was considered a relatively gentle and intelligent person. Until then, he did not differ in any particularly decisive actions or radical views. No one was afraid of him, therefore, probably, he became a compromise candidate who was acceptable to various groups in the political elite of those years. By this time, it became clear to many: the USSR has no future. On the one hand, the Soviet economic model was stalled, due to which the situation in the economy deteriorated rapidly. Labor productivity left much to be desired, there was a general shortage of goods and services, grain imports increased, and external debt increased. If not for the rise in the prices of oil, gold and other commodities in the 1970s, the Soviet Union would have collapsed much earlier.

The war in Afghanistan worsened the ability to finance the Soviet system from outside. Ronald Reagan took a tough course of confrontation, and the USSR again had to participate in an arms race that was already unbearable for him. The collapsing economy, ideological vacuum, the war in Afghanistan, which did not find a patriotic response among the people - all this was the reason for the start of radical changes in the country.

In April 1985, the young (by Soviet standards) Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR. Of course, he had no trace of any reform plan. But what a striking difference from Brezhnev, Chernenko, Andropov! In December 1984, he visited the UK, met with Margaret Thatcher and made a favorable impression on her. Simple in communication, not a "hawk", likes to talk about problems, clearly strives for international recognition. You can work with this.

1.2 Gorbachev's reforms

Soon, Gorbachev began a massive purge of the party apparatus, but the infection was already so deep that it did not give a serious result. Gorbachev could not save the rotten system.

The shortage of personnel, which is still noticeable today, was extremely acute then. From the first steps, he began tossing about what, to whom and how to do Gorbachev clearly did not know what to do. The very first major action of the authorities - limiting drunkenness (our real national misfortune) - turned out to be a complete failure. It seems that the goals were pursued right, but everything was done so absurdly that the result was just the opposite. Instead of gratitude, Gorbachev deserved ridicule, and the stupid execution of the directives led to an even greater undermining of confidence in the authorities. Budget revenues sharply decreased, but they did not drink less (home brewing has received an unprecedented development). There was a lot of chatter in the economy then and almost no real business. One definite achievement is the resolution of the cooperative movement. Since no one really understood what cooperatives were, in fact, purely private enterprises were allowed, moreover, with an almost complete absence of taxes. Many of today's new Russians started just then, that is, the foundations of private business were laid by Mikhail Gorbachev.

The countries of Eastern Europe quickly realized that the USSR was weakened and now they are their own masters. Rapid democratic changes began in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia. It is clear that these countries should be grateful to Gorbachev.

The politicians within the country understood the same - the union republics "moved". A gradual collapse of the Union began, centrifugal tendencies were growing like a snowball. The main slogan of Mikhail Gorbachev is the improvement of the socialist political and economic system. The country took more and more foreign loans, bought Western machinery and equipment, which rusted in warehouses and freight stations, and, of course, nothing changed. As before, there were no property rights, freedom of competition and freedom of prices - the economic reform actually stalled.

The only major political breakthrough during the perestroika period was made in the field of publicity, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and movement. For the first time under Mikhail Gorbachev, the process of mass emigration stopped for some time - people believed that the country had a chance, there was a future, and there was no need to leave here for the West.

On the one hand, there was political freedom (remember - "glasnost"!), On the other - the economic system doomed to death, plus attempts to preserve the party's commanding role. Taking into account the urgent national problems with general economic difficulties and a weak center, the collapse of the Union was inevitable. As a result, the system could not stand it and exploded - all the leaders of the union republics were interested only in personal power. Boris Yeltsin was no exception here. Everyone wanted to get his kingdom and become a full-fledged master in it. Nobody thought about the good of the people and did not ask his opinion.

In a word, for the most part, Gorbachev simply went with the flow, almost without influencing events, without seeking to streamline them and set them a certain vector. Meanwhile, the Soviet system was rapidly falling apart. Bloody conflicts on ethnic grounds occurred in Sumgait and Fergana, blood was shed in Baku, Tbilisi, Vilnius. National contradictions deepened, centrifugal processes intensified, and the Soviet state machine gave more and more tangible failures.

The entire USSR shuddered when he heard about the massacre of Armenians in Sumgait, yesterday's neighbors were killing each other, sparing neither women nor children. Hundreds of corpses throughout the country showed that perestroika, unwittingly, revealed deep national problems that the Soviet government had previously only artificially concealed. And Gorbachev continued to speak more and more lengthy and vague speeches and could not stop. People stopped listening to his speeches and started laughing at him openly. He constantly traveled abroad, begging for loans and receiving congratulations on events in which he did not take part, which he did not direct and on which he had almost no influence at all.

Mikhail Gorbachev's key problem was the inability to act, the inability to create a strong team, the inability to look into tomorrow. The achievements of his domestic policy were reduced to the removal of censorship and restrictions on movement (which, however, was extremely important).

People quickly became disillusioned with such one-sided reforms. On the other hand, it was under Gorbachev that long-overdue changes in the political and economic system began, thanks to which he will go down in history forever, despite the fact that in Russia itself his popularity rating does not reach even 1%.

In the West, the point of view is accepted that this expensive arms race has finished the USSR. Other experts believe that "perestroika" was planned by Gorbachev and therefore he can and should be considered the greatest leader of our time. In Russia itself, many citizens, especially the older generation, consider Gorbachev a traitor, destroyer, agent of the West.

Gorbachev in world history will remain the person who changed its course. Moreover, he did the impossible: he crushed not just the regime and the empire - he brought down the world system, which was claiming global domination, and brought it down just when it still seemed unshakable, thereby changing the world order. Gorbachev was the first Russian leader to choose not to use violence in his power struggle, while still controlling the instruments of violence. Gorbachev was the first leader in russian historywho left the top post without resisting or trying to prolong his power through the search for a successor. He left with dignity and with his head held high, without clinging to the Kremlin, which has never happened in the history of this empire.

I believe that Mikhail Gorbachev sincerely tried to save the Soviet system by modernizing it and was defeated. He did not understand the hopelessness of his attempt, did not understand the essence of the problems facing him, but he undoubtedly played an outstanding role in our history.

2. The beginning of Yeltsin's rule

Graduated from the Faculty of Civil Engineering of the Ural Polytechnic Institute named after. CM. Kirov, B.N. Yeltsin is an athlete, a builder and a born leader, immersed in the thick of real life, is a living bearer of modern human experience. The thirst for change against the backdrop of a sudden slowdown in reforms, an increasing divergence of words and deeds (this process in the newspapers of that time was called "chattering perestroika") creates a socio-psychological need in society for a leader of a different, charismatic type. And active, dynamic B.N. Yeltsin is happy to try on this new role.

Accustomed to decisive action, Boris Yeltsin immediately began to carry out radical economic transformations in the country. Masons, who have been harassing Boris Yeltsin since the time of the Interregional Deputy Group of 1989, proposed one of their young activists, Yegor Gaidar, to implement economic reforms. On January 2, 1992, E. Gaidar began a "shock therapy" program by releasing prices for all goods in the country. The jump in prices turned out to be much stronger than declared; prices for some goods increased dozens of times.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin were not always hostile to each other. Two communist bosses, two party secretaries: one - of the Stavropol regional committee, the other - of the Sverdlovsk regional committee - why should they be at enmity? One, Gorbachev, had gone up the hill earlier - the secretary of the Central Committee, a member of the Politburo and, finally, the general secretary. The other, Yeltsin, was late, and was dragged to Moscow by Gorbachev, who had gone ahead, who, having become the head of the party (and, accordingly, the state), having conceived perestroika, began to shake up the party and state elite, recruit his own team. Yeltsin also got into it. I got it - at the suggestion of the second person in the party, the secretary of the Central Committee Yegor Ligachev. So it was these two that Yeltsin owed his sharp career advancement, and, accordingly, seemed to have felt immense and inescapable gratitude to both.

But Yeltsin was not like that. At some point, he rebelled ...

3. The collapse of the USSR

The President of the USSR, striving to save his project, put forward the idea of \u200b\u200brenewing the Soviet Union through the conclusion of a new Union Treaty. As part of the continuation of the political reform, the economic independence of the Soviet republics grew, and their bodies of state power were renewed. However, all these changes against the background of the deepening economic crisis contributed to the growth of contradictions with the Union Center and the further "dispersal" of the republics. The dismantling of the communist party apparatus of control and coercion led to a complete weakening of the ideological and economic bonds of the once united union: the national elites no longer saw any rational arguments in favor of the further finding of their republics within the USSR and began to practically implement plans for their secession.

Under these conditions, the political struggle for the symbolic center of the Soviet Union - Russia and Moscow - began to play a special role. In the initial period of reforms on the initiative of M.S. Gorbachev was appointed chief political leader of Moscow B.N. Yeltsin who quickly made this city a "showcase of perestroika". Subsequently B.N. Yeltsin was removed from all party posts and, according to the logic of party bureaucrats, should have sunk into political obscurity. In practice, however, the opposite happened. In the wake of social and political activity in the late 1980s - early 1990s, B.N. Yeltsin was elevated to the heights of power in the RSFSR and headed the renewed Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

From that moment until the collapse of the USSR, M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin are becoming a kind of political antipodes for each other.

A qualitative change in the situation took place in August 1991, when the conservative part of the union leadership attempted a coup d'etat and created the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) in order to keep the Soviet system of power unchanged. The actions of the GKChP were called "putsch".

Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin took the most active, one might say, key participation in the events. Yeltsin resolutely refused to recognize the authority of the State Emergency Committee and organized active resistance to it. The main motive was political - the actions of the communists were contrary to the bourgeois-democratic views of Yeltsin, the model of 1991. Another motive for resistance was that the allied bodies in any form limited the personal power of B. Yeltsin, who was striving for autocracy. Yeltsin's "autocracy" and, at the same time, "democracy" is a paradoxical reality and a trait of Boris Yeltsin's character.

Arriving early in the morning of August 19, 1991, at the House of Soviets of Russia, at that time nicknamed the White House, Boris Yeltsin climbed onto a tank exposed by the putschists and read out an appeal from it, calling not to carry out the orders of the State Emergency Committee. The image of Yeltsin on a tank went down in history and became a symbol of the decisiveness of Boris Yeltsin's actions in this episode and many future ones. Yeltsin was able to organize active resistance, his supporters formed combat detachments, the defenders of the White House were armed with several hundred barrels of machine guns and several dozen machine guns. Yeltsin's supporters raided the troops, which in droves began to go over to Yeltsin's side and raised tricolor flags on armored vehicles. Among those who transferred was the commander of the airborne troops of the USSR Armed Forces, Pavel Grachev.

After three days of confrontation, the coup failed, B. Yeltsin sent a plane with armed officers led by General A. Rutskoi to release M. Gorbachev. The four-year conflict with Gorbachev ended in Yeltsin's complete triumph, who, having suffered at first a crushing defeat, did not fold his hands and found a way to victory from a hopeless situation. The last humiliation of Gorbachev was the situation when B. Yeltsin unexpectedly interrupted his speech on the podium and forced the bewildered Gorbachev, in front of millions of TV viewers, to sign a decree banning the CPSU.

After the defeat of the State Emergency Committee, Yeltsin issued a number of Decrees reassigning the allied army, militia, KGB, USSR President Gorbachev. In September 1991, Yeltsin supported Gorbachev's idea of \u200b\u200btransforming the USSR into a Union of Sovereign States, and in October announced that "Russia will never initiate the collapse of the Union." Yeltsin gained power over the USSR and was no longer interested in fighting against the Soviet

Union, but the situation was already developing in a different scenario. Immediately after the defeat of the coup, Ukraine adopted the "Declaration of Independence", and the USSR de facto ceased to exist.

4. Yeltsin and Gorbachev: the struggle of the titans

I think the West was very fortunate that Mikhail Gorbachev, and not Boris Yeltsin, became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The first is a relatively soft and indecisive professional careerist bureaucrat. The second is a seasoned wolf who managed to make a party career, first of all, thanks to his toughness and assertiveness. These two antipodes were pitted against each other by fate.

Boris Yeltsin came into conflict with the communist system, in my opinion, primarily because, by old Soviet standards, with a relatively young Gorbachev, he had no chance to climb to the very top of the political ladder under any circumstances. If he had become the General Secretary of the Communist Party, he would have defended communism with all his might, not sparing the democrats and reformers in the least. We are very lucky that it was not Yeltsin who saved communism.

Yeltsin is an intuitive rather than rational politician. He senses problems, and does not identify them based on studying and analyzing the situation. He clearly lacked the knowledge to solve the vast majority of public administration issues, but at the same time intuitively he almost always went in the right direction.

In other words, Yeltsin was a type of a fighter leader, a tribune leader, who feels good in public, who loves to rule the masses, but by no means a subtle administrator and business executive, not a person capable of looking into the future and overflowing with new ideas. What he really knew brilliantly was to capture the mood of society with amazing accuracy, unravel the intrigues of rivals and deliver preemptive strikes. At the same time, he cannot be denied personal courage, although he often preferred to unjustifiably delay decisions.

Continuing comparative analysis two previous leaders of our country, it should be noted that the Sverdlovsk region (which was once led by B. Yeltsin) and the Stavropol Territory (which was once headed by M. Gorbachev) are very different places. The largest northern industrial region, rigidly debugged, mechanistic, and the southern agricultural region, dependent on weather conditions and agricultural pests ... By the very nature of the fiefdom he inherited, Yeltsin is much more like a seasoned regional committee secretary (of the Stalinist type) than Gorbachev.

Boris Nikolayevich's wife, Naina, is a gentle and very modest woman who never dominated the Yeltsin family (unlike Raisa Gorbacheva) and this, by the way, says a lot about the character of Boris Nikolayevich himself. The wife usually has qualities that her husband lacks.

Yeltsin is much less gentle, verbose and streamlined than Gorbachev, and, accordingly, he has more decisiveness, harshness and indifference to the feelings of the people around him. He could drink a lot, take a steam bath, swim in an ice-hole - a real Russian man by accepted concepts. However, Yeltsin was not only tough, but at times cruel. Not everyone is able to order his press secretary (V. Kostikov) to be thrown overboard into the icy water of the Yenisei, to gently hug and kiss the official (S. Stepashin), whom he himself will dismiss tomorrow, to arrange a public undeserved cheating on the venerable minister (Rodionov, there was such a minister defense).

Yeltsin erased from his life dozens of people who were once very close to him and at the same time did not remember them again. But among them were people who risked their lives and careers for his sake. Of all Yeltsin's comrades-in-arms and close aides, practically none have survived in power to this day.

Boris Yeltsin earned the love of Soviet democrats by starting to rudely "run into" Moscow party members, setting ordinary people against their bosses - he proudly showed the public his domestic boots and watches, raided store backrooms to find hidden goods, and solemnly transferred to Moskvich. and enrolled in the district clinic. Some of the secretaries of the district party committee in Moscow even committed suicide because of his unfair thrashing, someone's heart could not stand it. But Yeltsin did not care about such trifles on his triumphal path to power.

Yeltsin's political style has always been distinguished by the most shameless populism, in contrast to Gorbachev's reserved officialdom. But his populism was not sincere, it did not correspond to his convictions. In fact, it was a cynical deception. Just one episode of his appointment to the district clinic is a symbolic act of fighting the privileges of officials, although under him the bureaucrats unraveled like never before. But at the same time, Yeltsin had an unconditional talent for leading a variety of people. We can say that Boris Nikolaevich was a politician from God.

Probably, Yeltsin was always interested in power only as an end, and not as a means - he, like Gorbachev, never had any positive program. By nature, perhaps, Yeltsin was even more a destroyer than a creator. Strikingly sharp instincts of self-preservation (a sense of danger), the frequent lack of formal logic, discouraging unpredictability - these are the characteristic features of Yeltsin the politician.

Alcohol and a penchant for eccentric antics also add a few colorful touches to Boris Yeltsin's portrait. Once the future president (and already a famous fighter with the system) fell from a bridge under strange circumstances (he seemed to be returning from a lady), then he was drunken conducting an orchestra in Berlin, then under the lens of a TV camera he pinched the secretary in the Kremlin. He did not leave the plane for a meeting with the Irish Prime Minister in Shannon, being in Sweden, he confused the countries in official speech and named Sweden Norway.

From the outset, Boris Yeltsin's behavior was dominated by one obsession — irreconcilable competition with Gorbachev. The main task for him was to obtain all the fullness of power.

Boris Yeltsin, unlike Gorbachev, was always capable of decisive action, even if these actions were on the verge of legality. For the sake of justice, it should be admitted that he never stooped to the closure of opposition newspapers, and all his political enemies remained at large. Yes, that is what he was - an authoritarian and impulsive President, capable, however, of keeping himself within certain limits.

Confrontation between two personalities, two political leaders in 1989-1991. ended in a complete victory for Boris Yeltsin, although many people thought Gorbachev was a more modern leader. Soon, however, Mikhail Gorbachev as a political figure disappeared from the domestic political scene, which testified to his lack of a real base, real forces on which he could rely, and therefore, his coming to power was an accident.

It is far from a fact that such an outcome of the struggle of the titans from all sides was unambiguously positive. But the passage of time cannot be changed, and the 1990s will forever go down in Russian history as the years of Boris Yeltsin's rule (he was in power almost twice as long as Gorbachev). Mikhail Gorbachev is perhaps the figure that is more important to the West, since the freedom of Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War came true under him and largely thanks to him. But it was Boris Yeltsin who defined the face of modern Russia.

Yeltsin, in comparison with Gorbachev, looked like a revolutionary, ready to go far beyond his slow and hesitant opponent. Indeed, it was Yeltsin who dealt the decisive blow to the USSR, acquiring the democratic legitimation of the Russian leader, and independent Russia, headed by a popularly elected leader, was already the end of the USSR. It was Yeltsin who became the banner of anti-communism. It was he who decided to go on creating a market. It was during the Yeltsin era that the restoration of the traditional Russian matrix began: autocracy, the combination of power and property, and Russia's return to its "spheres of influence." No wonder Russia declared that it inherits the role of the USSR.

Gorbachev’s rule is also dramatic because he didn’t foresee what the consequences of his endeavors would be, that his breakthrough robbed him of power, and that his own country was not yet ready to do him justice. Still, the most important thing is that Gorbachev opened the country to freedom and hope.

Understanding the events that took place in the Soviet Union and Russian Federation from the memorable autumn of 1991 to the present time, largely depends on how we relate M.S. Gorbachev with B.N. Yeltsin, Gorbachevskaya restructuring with Yeltsin's liberal-democratic reforms ... Different judgments and opinions are expressed on this account. For example, A. Razumov resolutely opposes Gorbachev to Yeltsin, not seeing any connection between them, let alone continuity. Gorbachev is natural, Yeltsin is accidental - he asserts.

Another opinion belongs to F.M. Burlatsky: If we compare the two prominent figures of the former USSR, two former party secretaries - Gorbachev and Yeltsin, he writes, it might seem that history has mistakenly mixed their places. Yeltsin looks like a mighty destroyer of the old system. And Gorbachev seemed to have been specially created for creative work. But history is a big joker, it has goals. Recall that she assigned Kerensky the role of the destroyer of the Russian monarchy, and Lenin - the creator of a new totalitarian state.Thus, in reality, Gorbachev is the destroyer of the old totalitarian system, and Yeltsin is the creator of the new liberal one.

The creative principle was noticed in Yeltsin by General D.A. Volkogonov. Gorbachev and Yeltsin, we read in his book, are the personal embodiment of the dramatic reformation in a gigantic country. The first began his utopian attempt to "renew" socialism, involuntarily opening the floodgates for himself to the natural historical stream, which so painfully washed away the ruins of Leninism. society on the rubble and amid the chaos left after the Bolshevik experiment .

The difference between Gorbachev the reformer and Yeltsin the revolutionary lies solely in the fact that one is inclined towards peaceful reformatory measures, and the other towards violent revolutionary actions. And ϶ᴛᴏ because reforms and revolutions in terms of their promising goals and final results, according to Shakhnazarov, are unambiguous, although they are carried out in different ways, the first from above, and the second from below. At the same time, it can hardly be denied that Gorbachev's “reforms” and Yeltsin's “revolution” were carried out from above against the will of the people, and often contrary to their moods and expectations. Hence, it is clear that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin are reformers who made changes in Soviet society from above, using the coercive force of state power.

Outcome reformation Gorbachev was expressively summed up by V.V. Sogrin: By the end of his tenure as president, the society he had accepted for reform lay in ruins. .

Another Kremlin wizard - President Yeltsin, not put to shame the Gorbachev case. Note that now we know what it led to revolution Yeltsin. It is worth noting that it led to even greater chaos, disintegration and destruction.That's why both Gorbachev and Yeltsin are, in our opinion, to the category of destroyers, but by no means creators

There is, of course, a difference between them. It is worth noting that it is in the scale and pace of the collapse of the Russian state and society. Gorbachev walked towards his goal relatively slowly, insinuatingly and carefully, avoiding abrupt and radical changes. Otherwise, he could not act, since the degree of risk was enormous: one hasty, ill-considered step - and he was finished, as they say, a cover. It must be admitted that Gorbachev fulfilled the most difficult, most difficult, most responsible and, I must say, the most dangerous part of the task for himself, displaying extraordinary dexterity, political resourcefulness, the ability to act, deceive and fool people.

Conclusion

And in conclusion, it should be noted that often M.S. Gorbachev is being blamed for his foreign policy, and one of the critics' arguments is that the last Soviet leader was a Westerner. Of course, this is correct to a certain extent when it comes to worldview, but the regional aspect of Gorbachev's course was sufficiently balanced. This, in particular, is proved by the activity of Soviet diplomacy in the Afghan, Chinese and Japanese directions. In general, it should be noted that the settlement in all these three areas was in the interests of the USSR: in relations with China and Afghanistan, it was necessary to create conditions for the normalization of the situation on the borders of the USSR, in relations with Japan the economic factor was of great importance. Of course, it cannot be said that everything that was planned worked out: in the case of Japan, in essence, there was a treadmill; actions in the Chinese direction, to a large extent, normalized bilateral relations, but by no means made them warm ; As for Afghanistan, it was not possible to solve the main geopolitical task - to remove or move the conflict from the borders of the USSR. So there were mistakes in the eastern direction (as well as in others) of the Soviet foreign policy course. However, there were also positive features. First, they chose the right strategic direction: to resolve conflicts and normalize relations. Secondly, in the case of Afghanistan, the USSR finally got out of a hopeless military adventure; in the case of China and Japan, they realized that there were no insoluble problems - we had to work. So, despite the miscalculations, on the whole, the course was chosen correctly - it met the interests of the USSR.

And Yeltsin had mistakes, and this must be admitted. Currently, those who criticize Yeltsin consider frequent personnel changes, which began immediately after his coming to power, as one of his main shortcomings. However, one can argue whether this is his mistake or not. The fact is that Yeltsin has always pursued a policy in which he set a certain political goal. To achieve this goal, he selected specific people, appointed them to important posts. When he saw that the task had been solved, or, on the contrary, the person could not cope with this task, he filmed it. One can criticize this policy, but it must be admitted that, being guided by precisely these principles, Yeltsin was able to solve a large number of important problems for Russia. He led the country to a market economy, he carried out democratic reforms and now acts as a guarantor of the observance of democratic rights and freedoms of citizens, who, by the way, have finally received the opportunity to elect parliament and the president democratically, he once again strengthened Russia in the world political arena. In addition, much of what Yeltsin did, he did for the first time in more than 70 years. He had a lot to teach the Russians, teach how to live in another, democratic country.

List of used literature

1. L. Shevtsova. Boris Yeltsin's regime. M. 1999.

I. Khlebnikov. The era of Yeltsin: Results and lessons // Power. 2000 No. 7.

B.N. Yeltsin. Confession on a given topic M. 2001.

Gorbachev M.S. August putsch (causes and effects). - M .: Publishing house "Novosti", 1991. - 96 p.

Boris Yeltsin. Notes of the President. - Moscow: Ogonek, 1994 .-- 374 p.

Ryzhkov N.I. The tragedy of a great country - M., Veche, 2007 - 652 p.

Chernyaev A.S. 1991 year. Diary of the Assistant to the President of the USSR. from 190-191.

Alekseeva T A. Political Science on the Russian Background. Study guide, Moscow: Luch Publishing House, 1993, 425 p.

Dobrokhotov L.N. Gorbachev-Yeltsin: 1500 days of political confrontation. M .: Terra, 1992, 244 p.

Gaidar E.T. The death of the empire. Lessons for modern Russia. - M .: Rosspen, 2006 .-- 440p.

Furman D. The Gorbachev Phenomenon. // Free thought. - 1995. - N11. - C / 60-71.

At the conference, the meetings of which were televised throughout the country, Yeltsin reiterated the provisions of his speech at the plenum on the air, demanded to cancel the decision on the "political fallacy" of that speech, and also to withdraw Ligachev from the Politburo. The conference refused to do this, Yeltsin was again subjected to impartial attacks, and soon the Supreme Soviet of the USSR withdrew him from the members of its Presidium. The meme, as we would call it now, was then the phrase that Ligachev said in his speech at the party conference: "Boris, you're wrong!"

Thanks to public debates at the party conference, Yeltsin, hitherto known mainly only in Moscow and Sverdlovsk, gained all-Russian popularity. He finally takes the path of open confrontation with the party-allied leadership, using the new possibilities of "glasnost" proclaimed by Gorbachev. There is information that before the elections in March 1989 of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR - the new supreme body of power created by the decision of the XIX Party Conference - Yeltsin was asked to pass through the list of 100 deputies to be elected by the Central Committee of the CPSU (of which Yeltsin remained). For Yeltsin's consent, they promised to restore him to his previous party posts. But Yeltsin chose to mobilize his supporters in democratic elections. He was overwhelmingly elected to the Congress from a national-territorial constituency that included Moscow. However, he did not get into the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Nevertheless, later, thanks to the refusal of deputy A.I. Kazannik from his mandate in favor of Yeltsin, despite the fact that such a procedure was not provided for by law, became a member of the Supreme Soviet.

In connection with the forthcoming elections in the spring of 1990 of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, Yeltsin shifted the center of gravity of the struggle against Gorbachev to the republican authorities, without trying to occupy a high place in the union authorities. This decision can be considered a borderline - from that moment on, the confrontation between the USSR and the RSFSR began. By that time, Yeltsin had already become one of the most authoritative leaders of the "democratic movement", constantly and sharply criticizing the leadership of the USSR and the CPSU for their unwillingness to establish genuine democracy in the country (during the same period, a sharpness was born that ridiculed Gorbachev's slogans: “What is the difference between democracy and democratization? - The same as the canal from the sewer "). The Democrats themselves nominated Yeltsin for the role of public leader. Numerous incidents in which Yeltsin skillfully presented himself as a victim of the intrigues of the leadership of the CPSU and even the attempts of the KGB to eliminate him physically, contributed to the growth of his popularity.

On the eve of the anniversary of the signing of the Declaration on the cessation of the existence of the USSR and the formation of the CIS, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, former President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze answered questions from the head of the RIA Novosti office in Georgia Besik Pipia.

Eduard Amvrosievich, on December 21, 1991 in Alma-Ata, the heads of 11 Soviet republics signed the Declaration on the termination of the existence of the USSR and the formation of the CIS. Do you think that the process of transformation of the Soviet Union into the CIS was inevitable and why?

At the end of the 80s, everything was going to ensure that the Soviet Union collapsed. At first, they started talking about creating a union of Slavic states, which would include Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. I remember when this information was leaked to the media, the then mayor of Moscow, Gavriil Popov, was indignant: since when did Russia become a Slavic country? After all, not only Russians live in Russia, but also Chechens, Bashkirs, Tatars and other peoples. The idea of \u200b\u200bcreating a Slavic union was not developed. For example, in Ukraine, they voted for independence in a referendum.

The collapse of the USSR was also accelerated by the confrontation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Gorbachev, naturally, was for a united Soviet Union; Yeltsin had already become the president of Russia. Maybe he was in favor of preserving the Soviet Union, but he and Gorbachev simply hated each other. We, the people who stood close to them, tried to somehow reconcile them. Did not work out.

Further, the process accelerated the conspiracy against Gorbachev, more precisely against the President of the USSR. Before that was my resignation. I had information that a counter-revolution was being prepared. I talked about it to one, to another, to a third, but I could not convince anyone. And then, in protest, I resigned.

A month and a half later, Gorbachev went to rest in Foros. But on the way, in my opinion, I drove to Minsk, met with an activist there and said that the threat of dictatorship was real, asked the supporters of perestroika to be more vigilant and prevent dictatorship.

Then there was the State Emergency Committee, a further aggravation of relations between the presidents of the USSR and Russia. It became impossible to stop the disintegration of the state.

- Georgia joined the CIS two years after the formation of the Commonwealth. Was this a forced step or a voluntary decision?

I did not aspire to the CIS, there was no great desire. Having got acquainted with the Charter of the Commonwealth, I realized that this is not an organization that can replace the Soviet Union. But Yeltsin really insisted, several times he called me and said, "I advise you: join the CIS." I was not against it, but then in the Georgian parliament, 30-40 percent of the deputies opposed joining the CIS, which they associated with the Soviet Union.

About 2 years later, I was in Moscow, went to Yeltsin and said that Georgia was ready to join the CIS, despite the fact that there are contradictions in the parliament. The tragedy of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was evident, and I believed that the solution to the problem would depend on Russia.

These problems turned out to be frozen for many years, but recently the third president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili, said that within a few months he would be able to return South Ossetia under Georgian jurisdiction.

I do not know. The same was said, by the way, by his friend - a former defense minister. Nothing succeeded. Now the pre-election campaign, presidential candidates are very generous in their promises and are handing them out left and right. Okruashvili (the former Ministry of Defense) said that he would return Sukhumi, too, but that it would not work that easily. If we manage to come to an agreement with Russia, find acceptable options for Georgia, Abkhazia and Russia, then a solution can be found.

I am sure that it is possible to come to an agreement with Putin, despite the complicated relations that have developed now between Russia and Georgia. Putin is a man of his word.

Once Putin was vacationing in Sochi, called me, invited me to talk about business. I arrived and met. Putin offered me to restore the Abkhazian section railroadso that trains can run to Baku, Yerevan and even to Turkey. I made a response request: to return the Georgian refugees to the Gali region. In Soviet times, 80,000 people lived in this area, mostly Georgians. A rich region, tea, citruses, nuts, fed almost half of Abkhazia.

Putin picked up the phone, called the commander of the peacekeeping forces and ordered the return of these people to the Gali region. Indeed, they could not gather everyone, but 50 or 60 thousand refugees returned to the Gali region.

- Let's get back to the Soviet Union. In your opinion, is such education possible to revive?

- Does the CIS have a future?

Yes, if this organization becomes truly operational, it will really influence the situation in the CIS space. Is it possible.

Let's move from the USSR and the CIS to independent Georgia. There are many rumors about your resignation from the post of President of Georgia. Some say that Saakashvili is your disciple, you deliberately transferred power through the Rose Revolution. Others say that you did not have the strength and means to suppress the protesters, others gossip that Moscow forced you to do this. How was it really?

Moscow has nothing to do with it.

- Why then did Igor Ivanov, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, come to visit?

Igor Ivanov came as my friend. Although he couldn't do anything. At first he met with the opposition, then we met. Ivanov was the head of the secretariat when I was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. We're just friends. But there was nothing he could do to support me.

I was standing on the podium in parliament, giving a speech when the conspirators Saakashvili, Zhvania and others burst in. I saw people in the hall armed with machine guns, pistols, knives, clubs ...

- Where were the roses?

There were no roses, I don’t know why it was called the “pink” revolution. I have not seen a single rose.

Naturally, when the threat arose, the guards took me out into the yard. There I saw, on the one hand, supporters of the opposition, on the other, my supporters, about two and a half thousand people. They urged me to hold on, they promised to take out on the street the next day 100 thousand people in my support.

I regarded the incident as an attempt at a coup d'etat, and announced the introduction of a special provision. As president and commander-in-chief, I could have given an order to use force and the army had to carry it out. But there would be victims on the other side and on this side.

From the car I phoned the office and demanded that the decree on the introduction of a special provision be revoked.

At home he told his wife that there would be no bloodshed, but from tomorrow I am no longer the president, since I am resigning.

Then, at a meeting with the conspirators - Saakashvili and Zhvania, the latter said that the most painless way out would be the resignation of the president. Since I had already made a decision for myself, I informed them that I was leaving the post of head of state.

Elections were held, Zhvania became prime minister, and then he was killed.

- Was he killed or was he gassed?

They killed. At first they said that he was gassed, but when they invited experts not only from ours, but also from America, the experts did not confirm that he was gassed.

Where he was killed, how it happened, I don't know.

- How do you explain what happened in Tbilisi at the beginning of this November?

The people are starving. I know that not everyone is rich in Russia either, there are certain problems in some regions. But there is no hunger in Russia, this is, by the way, Putin's merit. He is a smart, competent person and he did business in such a way that people live decently in Russia. And we have complete poverty and hunger ...

- How do you assess the reaction of the Georgian authorities?

When it was reported that the people were going to Tbilisi, on the same day the president should have entered into a dialogue with the people. If he promised half of what he is promising now, even one third, the people would disperse. None of this would have happened.

And the closure of the Imedi TV channel is generally barbaric, no one treats television like that in any country. Does American television only say kind words about Bush? He is declined in all cases. But in America, TV channels were not closed, and in no other country they do not do that.

How do you assess the alignment of forces on the eve of the presidential elections in Georgia? Who, in your opinion, of the presidential candidates can bring more benefit to the country?

I do not exclude that the people will elect Saakashvili. But the opposition may not accept this, there are quite strong guys there, and many people support them. If Saakashvili is defeated, no one knows how he will behave. I mean, there could be riots again, again there could be a threat of civil war.

- What can you say about Badri Patarkatsishvili?

Badri got to Georgia thanks to me. He was wanted, he and Berezovsky.

I had some kind of relationship with Badri. Rather, at our embassy in the Russian Federation. If a negative program regarding Georgia was being prepared on the Russian ORT channel, where he then worked as a commercial director, it was enough to call Badri, and he removed this program from the air.

By the way, I once told Putin that the person you are looking for was given a Georgian passport and registered in Tbilisi. “Berezovsky? - Putin asked. " I say no, Badri Patarkatsishvili. "Ah, Badri," Putin said, "no, Badri is not bad, Badri is good."

Patarkatsishvili is also running for the presidency of Georgia. If I were president, I would appoint him prime minister. He is a very smart person, he knows how to count money, he was seriously involved in charitable activities, he spent a lot of money on this, we not only respect him, but also love him.

But now he is not in Tbilisi. They dug up some things against him, I do not know, legal or illegal, they say that it is illegal.

Let me ask you a question about the presidential elections in Russia. How do you feel about the fact that the name of the future president is practically known?

It is very important for me that Putin in one form or another will remain in the leadership of Russia. He will have a majority in parliament and the people respect him. If Putin becomes prime minister, he will essentially be the first person. I heard about Medvedev that he is an educated competent person, but I have no personal acquaintance with him.

- Is there a recipe for improving relations between Georgia and Russia?

Everything depends on the top officials in our countries - Putin and who will be elected in Georgia.

Reciprocal steps are needed, and the first must be taken by the Georgian president. But if Putin takes the initiative, it will certainly beautify him, everyone will think that this person is generous.

- Eduard Amvrosievich, how are you going to meet New Yearwhat gifts are you waiting for?

As a rule, I do not receive gifts. Gifts were presented when I was minister of foreign affairs, when guests, prime ministers, ministers, etc. came. I will celebrate the New Year at home, as usual. Almost all of our family will gather. A son with his children will come from Paris, a granddaughter from Moscow, the rest live here, in Tbilisi.

These two antipodes were pitted against each other by fate.

Back in 1989, Yeltsin spoke at length about the socialist market, about the transformation and modernization of the socialist system. He was never an adherent of a firm ideology and, understandably, did not have firm democratic convictions or specific market views. All talk about the reform of Boris Yeltsin is not worth a damn. No one, with all their will, will remember a single serious personal initiative of Yeltsin aimed at constructively creating something new in Russia. His credo was boundless populism. He felt best of all precisely at the moment of danger, at the moment of the struggle for power, he was a fighter, not a builder. After winning the fight, he immediately went into a half-sleep mode and stopped all activity. By this feature, he resembles a wolf, which, having lifted a sheep, rests until it gets hungry again.

It has always seemed to me that Yeltsin is a politician rather intuitive than rational. He senses problems, and does not identify them based on studying and analyzing the situation. He clearly lacked the knowledge to solve the vast majority of issues of public administration, but at the same time, intuitively, he almost always went in the right direction.

Boris Yeltsin, of course, was a natural product of his era, and therefore it would be absurd to count on a conscious and detailed understanding of all the most complex economic problems by him. At the same time, unlike Gorbachev, he was more able to take responsibility and take risks, nominating relatively young people to the highest positions, whose views were often incomprehensible to him and even alien to him.

Personally, I was always impressed that, unlike many other well-known politicians, Yeltsin never swears, is even in communication, knows how to listen carefully and hear his subordinates (which happens very rarely among the highest echelon of power). True, at the same time, the chances that he would listen to smart advice and follow it were always slim.

Continuing a comparative analysis of the two previous leaders of our country, it should be noted that the Sverdlovsk Region (which was once headed by B. Yeltsin) and the Stavropol Territory (which was once headed by M. Gorbachev) are very different places. The largest northern industrial region, rigidly debugged, mechanistic, and the southern agricultural region, dependent on weather conditions and agricultural pests ... By the very nature of the fiefdom he inherited, Yeltsin is much more like a hardened regional committee secretary (of the Stalinist type) than Gorbachev.

He mercilessly dismissed those whom he hugged and awarded yesterday, whom he called the best minister of all time (this was the case with Pavel Grachev, the former defense minister). In Russian it is called - hand over your own. In fact, during his presidency, Yeltsin surrendered all his supporters and close associates, except for family members.

The best example here is the same former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, a rustic and rude paratrooper, who sided with Boris Yeltsin in 1991 during the August putsch, for which he was promoted to minister. Grachev drank with the President, went to the bathhouse with him, swam, rested and seemed to enjoy his unlimited trust, although he was clearly incompetent - he failed the 1994-1995 Chechen campaign. and army reform. All sins were forgiven Grachev, awards poured down on him like a horn of plenty, but the time came, and overnight he disappeared from Yeltsin's life. As if it never existed.

Boris Yeltsin earned the love of the Soviet democrats by starting to rudely "run into" Moscow party members, setting ordinary people against their superiors - he proudly showed the public his domestic boots and watches, raided store back rooms to find hidden goods, solemnly transferred to Moskvich and enrolled in the district clinic. Some of the secretaries of the district party committee in Moscow even committed suicide because of his unfair thrashing, someone's heart could not stand it. But Yeltsin did not care about such trifles on his triumphant path to power.

The interregional deputy group (the first democrats) in the first free parliament of the USSR did not have an indisputable leader and therefore decided to take advantage of the popularity of the famous party dissident Yeltsin. Yeltsin, in turn, always kept his distance and did not get along with any of the democrats - he used their services, but did not particularly listen to their advice. As a result of this strange alliance, none of the first wave of Democrats stayed long at the helm of the state.

Probably, Yeltsin was always interested in power only as an end, and not as a means - he, like Gorbachev, never had any positive program. By nature, perhaps, Yeltsin was even more a destroyer than a creator. Strikingly sharp instincts for self-preservation (a sense of danger), the frequent absence of formal logic, discouraging unpredictability - these are the characteristic features of Yeltsin the politician.

Alcohol and a penchant for eccentric antics also add a few colorful touches to the portrait of Boris Yeltsin. Once the future president (and already a famous fighter with the system) fell from a bridge under strange circumstances (he seemed to be returning from a lady), then he was drunken conducting an orchestra in Berlin, then under the lens of a TV camera he pinched the secretary in the Kremlin. He did not leave the plane to meet with the Irish prime minister in Shannon, being in Sweden, he confused the countries in his official speech and called Sweden Norway.

You can also recall some other drunken escapades like beating toccata on the head of some bureaucrat with spoons or smearing caviar on a hand at a reception in honor of US President George W. Bush.

Yeltsin repeatedly made theatrical gestures like “We’re not sitting like that” (when he publicly pricked Prime Minister Primakov, having put Stepashin next to him at the meeting). And what about his frequent long and significant pauses in his performances, intended for the audience?

There were even cleaner things - like the already mentioned order to throw the press secretary of Kostikov off the board of a steamer into the cold Siberian river, or to serve a small need on an airplane wheel abroad. Is it possible to imagine in a civilized country a scene when the president orders his guards to throw a high dignitary overboard, and they unquestioningly follow the order? Some kind of Middle Ages! But, in one way or another, we have been witnesses of this Middle Ages for the last ten years.

From the very beginning, one obsession dominated Boris Yeltsin's behavior - irreconcilable competition with Gorbachev. The main task for him was to obtain full power. I remember well how in 1990, as Minister of Finance, I came to him to discuss the new budget (with Prime Minister I. Silaev), but instead of that we discussed the popularity ratings of Gorbachev and Yeltsin for half an hour (it fell for the former, and grew for the latter).

I can testify that the Russian government of 1990, created by Boris Yeltsin, was not that strong professionally, but it had a political mandate to reform. Grigory Yavlinsky then managed to incite Gorbachev and Yeltsin to a joint program "500 days", which was based on the developments of Yavlinsky's group together with my already mentioned developments.

Today this program is often laughed at. But people who have not read it laugh. I argue that for that time it was a powerful intellectual breakthrough - the vast majority of the proposals and ideas outlined in this program were eventually confirmed and were subsequently used. This plan did not schedule five hundred days per hour, as is usually thought, it contained two volumes of elaborations, including a large number of draft laws and regulations.

The real trouble with the program was that no one was going to do it. First of all, this concerns Yeltsin, whom the democrats brought to power precisely in the hope of obtaining reforms, but he himself never really needed these reforms. All that was needed was power.

At the same time, I drew attention to such a Russian phenomenon, most of the representatives of the old elite, the older generation of bureaucrats, economists and politicians have a sharply negative attitude to any proposals of the younger generation. Nobody delves into the essence and does not listen to arguments.

To a large extent, this applies to Yeltsin, who never gave the reformers complete freedom of action (therefore, he cannot be compared with Pinochet or, say, with Argentine President Menem). Thanks to this property of the old cadres, we still hear the illiterate arguments of the current members of the government about monetarism and macroeconomic policy. Thanks to this property, the country has lost and is losing years.

I got the impression that after the victory over Mikhail Gorbachev, Yeltsin, in fact, lost the meaning of life. He achieved what he so passionately aspired to. After 1992, he is practically inactive, except for several fights with parliament (the shooting of the White House in 1993 and an impeachment attempt in 1999) and his own re-election in 1996, but at these moments it was already about his own survival.

Gorbachev could also sometimes be adamant, he could chew on someone and even swear at someone, but at the same time he was chronically incapable of great deeds and was afraid of personal responsibility. In the event that something important happened at his submission (for example, the introduction of troops into Baku), he immediately rushed to the side and substituted his subordinates.

The so-called putsch in August 1991 contributed a lot to Yeltsin's final victory. Then the associates of Mikhail Gorbachev could not stand his inactivity and tried to stop the collapse of the country with the help of emergency measures. However, the putschists were afraid to go beyond statements and threats - the Communist Party did not participate in the coup, orders to arrest and neutralize Yeltsin and his supporters were never issued. After a short moment of confusion, Yeltsin was able to straighten out the situation and soon became the unlimited ruler of Russia. Returning to Moscow from Foros, Mikhail Gorbachev was surprised to find that he no longer had real power.

The confrontation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin ended forever.

It is far from a fact that such an outcome of the struggle of the titans from all sides was unambiguously positive. But the passage of time cannot be changed, and the 1990s will forever go down in Russian history as the years of Boris Yeltsin's rule (he was in power almost twice as long as Gorbachev). Mikhail Gorbachev is perhaps the figure that is more important for the West, since the freedom of Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War came true under him and largely thanks to him. But it was Boris Yeltsin who defined the face of modern Russia.